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Of  the many  direct  and  indirect  methods  of  charging  for  road use,
the key alternatives  for reducing  road congestion  are (1) cordon
pricing using manual tollbooths, (2) supplementary  vehicle
licensing, (3) automatic vehicle identification,  and (4) smart
card technology.
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is part  of a larger effort  in the department  to evaluate  options  to charge  for the use of roads. Copies  of the
paper  are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact
Jennifer  Francis, room S  10-063,  extension 31005  or 35205 (December  1992,  99 pages).
Hau explores  20 criteria  for a "good" road  electronic  road pricing scheme  can now be
pricing  system and presents  case studies  illustrat-  overcome  by giving  road users  access  to confi-
ing the costs, revenues,  and benefits  of altema-  dential  "numbered  account  arrangements"  with a
tive congestion  charging  mechanisms.  prepaid  cash deposit.
Hau finds  that manual  tollbooths  are not  The capital  cost of electronic  road  pricing
suitable  for congestion  charging  because  they are  with smart card technology  (an on-vehicle
land-, labor-,  and time-intensive.  Cordon  pricing  charging  system)  is higher  than the cost for
(as in the Bergen  toll ring) can be an effective  automatic  vehicle  identification  technology
instrument  for charging  for congestion  if half the  alone,  but benefits  still outweigh  costs (as in the
toll lanes are reserved  for seasonal  pass holders  Dutch proposal).  Together,  the benefit-cost  ratio
traveling  through  the pricing  points at regular  and the cost per transaction  are acceptable  but
highway  speed. Enforcement  of those driving  in  this technology  is still not widely  used commer-
reserved  lanes can be carried out by periodic  cially.
videographs  of vehicle  license  plates.  Hau argues that electronic  approaches  to
Area licensing  schemes  require  that vehicles  direct road use charging  are superior  to manual
entering  the central  business  district during peak  approaches  for road users, road authorities,  and
hours  prominently  display  a monthly  or daily  society  as a whole. And rapid  progress  in micro-
license.  Enforcement  is undertaken  at gantry  electronics,  cryptology,  and microwave  tech-
points by traffic wardens  who  perfonn visual  nologies  will  continue  to yield large-scale
checks  on the nonstop  traffic. The enforcement  economies  in the manufacturing  of automatic
costs of area licensing  schemes  are prohibitive  at  vehicle  identification  equipment,  read-write
motorway  speeds  but relatively  low-cost  in a  transponders,  smart  cards, and the hardware  and
standard  congested  urbai.  fetting with limited  software  that go with them.
gateways.  Area licensing  schemes,  also known  Hau ranks electronic  road pricing  with
as supp;ementary  licensing,  carry the lowest cost  automatic  vehicle  identification  alone higher
per transaction.  than  electronic  road pricing with smart  card-type
Electronic  road  pricing with automatic  AVI based on an unweighted  index of all crite-
vehicle  identification  (an off-vehicle  recording  ria. And  generally,  the area  licensing scheme  is
system)  is electronic  toll collection  by time of  superior  to cordon pricing.  If budgets allow,
day writ large and made  obligatory  on vehicle  authorities  should  investigate  the feasibility  of
owners  in a jurisdiction.  The cost of the elec-  electronic  road pricing.  If the budget  is tight,
tronic  equipment  is not trivial,  but is outweighed  they should  look into the area licensing  scheme
by the benefits.  Sensitivity  analysis  perfonmed  with its low cost and high benefit-cost  ratio (the
on the Hong  Kong electronic  road pricing  latter being  the most important  of the 20 criteria
scheme  in 1983-85  shows  that even  after exclud-  Hau uses).
ing time savings,  the savings  in operating  costs  Both conceptually  and practically,  Hau finds
produce  benefit figures  that are greater  than  that it is important  to earmark  the proceeds  of
system costs.  The invasion-of-privacy  issue  that  road pricing  to implement  marginal  cost pricing
led to the political  failure of the Hong Kong  in the road sector.
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SYNOPSIS
Congestion  Charging  Mechanisms  for Roads: An Evaluation  of Current Practice
by
Timothy  D. Hau
This  paper  investigates  the implementation  aspects  of road  pricing  by setting  down  criteria
for a 'good' road  pricing  system. Besides  analyzing  the gamut  of indirect  and direct  methods  of
charging  for road  usage,  the paper  surveys  alternative  congestion  pricing  technologies  including:
1) cordon  pricing  using  manual  tollbooths,  2) supplementary  licensing,  3) off-vehicle  recording
systems  such as automatic  vehicle  identification,  commonly  known  as AVI, and 4) on-vehicle
charging  systems  such as smart  card technology.  Each of these  instruments  is dealt with by a
relatively  in-depth  case  study  analysis  based  on the benefits,  costs  and revenues  of implementing
and utilizing  each charging  mechanism.  Since  benefit  figures  are not always  readily  available,
the cost  per transaction  of operating  a system  over  the  long run is used  as an index  of the relative
cost-effectiveness  of each technology.  Based  on alternative  quantitative  and qualitative  criteria,
the implications  of using  each  of these  technologies  for tackling  congestion  are summarized  in a
key table  and conditional  policy  recommendations  are made.
Tollbooths  suffer  from being  land intensive,  labor intensive  and time intensive  and are
clearly  unsuitable  for congestion  charging  in and of themselves.  However,  cordon  pricing  (as  in
the Bergen  Toll Ring)  can serve  as an effective  instrument  of charging  for congestion  if half  the
toll lanes  are reserved  for the use of seasonal  pass holders  traveling  through  the pricing  points  at
regular  highway  speeds. Enforcement  of those  drving on reserved  lanes  can be carried  out by
periodic  videographs  of vehicle  license  plates,  just as radar  technology  is a socially  acceptable  tool
to apprehend  speedsters. Area licensing  schemes (ALSs)  require that vehicles  enterng the central
business  district during peak hours display a  monthly  or  daily license prominently,  with
enforcement  being  undertaken  at gantry  points  by traffic  wardens  who  perform  visual  checks  on
the nonstop  traffic.  Enforcement  of ALS would  be prohibitively  costly when  carried out at
motorway  speeds  but would  likely involve  relatively  low cost in a standard  congested  urban
environment  with limited  gateways. ALS, also known  as supplementary  licensing,  is found  to
possess the lowest cost per transaction. Electro?Jc  road  pricing (RP)  wih AVW  is electronic toll-vi  -
collection  by time-of-day  larit  and made  obligatory  on vehicle  owners  within  a jurisdiction.
Even  though  the cost of the electronic  equipment  for AVI  is not considered  trivial,  the benefits
are considerably  higher  than the cost. As the sensitivity  analysis  performed  on the Hong  Kong
ERP  Scheme  in 1983-85  clearly  demonstates,  even  after  excluding  time  savings  on philosophical
or other  grounds,  the savings  in operating  cost  stil yield  benefit  figures  that outweigh  the system
cost. The much  touted  invasion-of-privacy  issue  that plagued  the Hong  Kong  ERP scheme  in the
past can now be dealt with by providing  road users access  to confidential  *numbered  account
arangements"  with  prepaid  cash  deposit. The capital  cost of ekctronic  road  pricing  with smail
card  technology  is higher  than  AVI alone  technology,  but the cost is still  le  than the beneilts.
Put together,  the benefit-cost  ratio and  the cost  per taction  can  be regarded  as acceptable,  but
this technology  is stil not yet widely  used  on a commercia  basis. Nevertheless,  rapid  progress
in micoelectronics,  cryptology  and microwave  technologies  will continue  to yield large-scale
economies  in the manu  of AVI  equipment,  read-write  trponders,  smart  cards  and the
hardware  and software  accompaniments.
Electronic  approaches  of direct road use chaWn  are shown  to be superior  to manual
approaches  whether  from the pewective of a road user, road authority  or society  as a whole.
Within  these  broad  categories,  ERP  using  AVI  is  anked  highe than  ERP  using  smart  card based
on an unweighted  index  of all the  criteria. In generl, ALS  is superior  to cordon  pricing. Hence,
if budgetary  conditions  allow it, the feasibility  of implementing  ERP ought  to be investigated.
However,  if budget  is tight, then AMS  (with  its low cost  and correspondingly  high benefit-cost
ratio)  ought  to be regarded  favorably. It is argued  that the most  important  measure  (out  of the
twenty criteria listed) is the passage  of the benefit-cost  test.  Nevertheles, by pursuing  the
multicriteria  analysis  introduced  in the  paper,  the  road  auhiority  could  choose  from  amongst  other
criteria  for deciding  on the appropriate  congestion  charging  instument.
Finally,  the  disposition  of the  revenues  collected  from  road  pricng is crucial  to its success.
Based  on experience  as well as conceptual  grounds,  it appears  that earmarking  of the proceeds
from road pricing would serve as an important  prerequisite  to the actual implementation  of
marginal  cost  pricing  in the road sector.Congestlon  Chargilg Mechanisms  for Roads: An Evaluation  of Current Practce
1.  Ovwr  80 percent  of the world's megacities  are projected  to be in developing  countries
by the year 2000. It is un1iky, however,  that  road  capacity  will be able  to keep  pace  with  the
rapid growth  in travel demand  resulting  from increases  in population  and vehicle  ownership.
Thus  it is inevitable  that urbanization  yields  tffic  congestion  as a by-product.'  Some  form  of
regulatory  restraint  or pricing  mechaniwi  is necessary  to curtail  congestion,  where congestion
is fonrally defined  to be the additional  cost  that a motorist  imnposes  on otners.
2.  This paper is the second  of two papers  on road pricing  in theory  and practice. In the
previous  paper,  the theory  of road  pricing-cum-inveatment  is reviewed  and synthesized  into an
integrated  analytical  framework  (Hau, 1992). Even  though  I deal  only with charging  for the
congestion  externality  in this paper, congestion  pricing  would  also have  as a by-product  the
reduction  of air and noise  pollution  from mobile  sources. This market-based  approach  could
serve  as an effective  deterrent  to the ovemse  of roads  by intemalizing  negative  extemalities  and
would  thus  enhance  society's  welfare  within  an urban  area. Even  though  congestion  pricing  per
se is practiced  only in Singapore,  road use  charging  in the form of electronic  toll collection  is
rapidly  flounshing  in countries  such  as Norway,  France,  Italy  and the United  States. Charging
by daylight  hours  in Trondheim,  Norvay (and  further  discounts  for  electronic  tag holders  during
the moning peak) can be viewed  as crude forms  of road pricing. As part of the Intermodal
Surface  Tansportation  Efficiency  Act (ISTEA)  signed  into law in December,  1991,  the U.S.
Federal Highway  Adminstration  invites state and local governments  to participat  n five
federally-funded  congestion  pricing  pilot  pgrams  (which  include  the  funding  of parking  prcing
(see  U.S. Department  of Transportation,  1992;  Office  of the Federal  Register,  1992)). Further,
bills to implement  variants  of road pricing  are in the parliament  of cities suffering  from both
L  pollution and congestion such as Sandago and Stockholm.
I  For estimates  of congeto  coa  and indices  an tdo United Statos,  wse  s  ad  Idmux (1990, 1992).3.  The  first  section  of the piper presents  a conceptual  framework  for congestion  pricing  and
sets down  the criteria  for a 'good' road pricing  system. The second  and third  sections  review
and analyze  the indirect  and direct  methods  of charging  for road usage. Both sections  cover a
taxonomy  of alternative  technologies  to implement  congestion  pricng.  The several basic
technologies  include:  1) cordon  pricing  using manual  tollbooths,  2) supplementary  vehicle
licensing,  3) off-vehicle  recording  systems  such  as automatic  vehicle  identification,  commonly
known  as AVI,  and 4) on-vehicle  charging  systems  such  as smart  card technology.  The paper
introduces  manual  and electronic  toll  collection  methods  as precursors  to the off-vehicle  and on-
vehicle  charging  instruments.  The  varous approaches  to road  priing are analyzed  progressively
by their level  of technological  advance  up to the increasingly  popular  electronic  toll collection
mechanisms  which  exploit  recent  developments  in automatic  vehicle  identification  and smart  card
technology. The benefits,  costs and revenues  of implementing  each charging  mechanism  are
analyzed. Since benefit  figures  are not always  readily  available,  the cost per tiansaction  of
operating  a system  over  the long  run  is used  as an index  of the relative  cost-effectiveness  of each
technology.  Based  on both quantitative  and qualitative  criteria, the implications  of using  each
of  these technologies  for  tackling congestion  are  summarized  and  conditional  policy
recommendations  are made.
L  CONCEVUAL  FRAMEWORK
4.  Urban  transport  is chiefly  characterzed  by a regular  pattern of peaked  demands  on a
diurnal  basis,  with  the highest  demand  occurrng  during  the  morning  and  afternoon  peak  perods.
Because  of the peaking  characteristic  of urban  travel demand,  in addition  to pent-up  demand,
Parldnson's  Law or Downs' Law of peak-hour  expressway  congestion  holds (Downs,  1962;
Mohring,  1965). Downs's  law says that whenever  new  expressways  are built  in metropolitan
areas,  crowded  conditions  develop  quickly  when  previously  suppressed  trips  are regenerated  and
daily travelers  switch  to their pnvate automobiles  and desired  times  of travel. Worse still,
when  traffic  den-;y is high  relative  to the capacity  of a facility,  travelers  more often  than not
wind  up in a common  gluepot  in which  traffic  cemes  to a virtual  standstll  during  the  peak  - as
seen  in the lengthy  all-day  peak  period  of cities  such  as Bangkok,  Hong  Kong,  Lagos,  Santiago,-3  -
Sao Paulo  and Seoul. This  admittedly  untenable  state  of affairs  persists  because  property  rights
are not clearly  defined. That  is, even  though  roads  are nominally  owned  by the government,
excessive  use is made  offreeways  because  travelers  are not appropriately  exzluded  from using
them. A road becomes  'worthless'  precisely  because  it is free (see  Vickhoy's  (1967)  two road
example)).
5.  Yet there  is considerable  excess  capacity  in urban  transport  if one were  to spread  travel
demand uniformly  over a  twenty-four  hour basis -- as  argued forcefully  in The Urban
TranQr1tatL  Problem,  by Meyer, Kain and Wohl (1965, pp. 83-88).  Hence, it is the
distinctive  nature  of the cyclic  peak/off-peak  period  demands  which  leads  to significant  resource
misallocation.
6.,  Indeed,  economists  have  long  held that  road  pricing  could  be a powerful  tool  in tackling
congestion,  improving  social  welfare  significantly.  For instance,  as early as 1959  Professor
William  Vickrey  was (and still is) championing  road pricing  via electronic  means  as a way  of
implementing  the marginal  cost  pricing  principle  (when  he testified  before  the Joint Committee
on Washington  Metropolitan  problems  of the  U.S. Congress).  It was  his testimony  which  helped
influence  the distinguished  members  of a panel on road pricing set up by the Ministry  of
TFransport  in the United  Kingdom,  which  culminated  in the famous  Smeed  Report  of 1964. To
draw our attention,  he starts out his celebrated  paper (1963, p. 452) on road pricing  using
automatic  means  as follows:
"I will  begin  with  the  proposition  that  in no other  major  area  are pricing  practices
so  irrational, so  out  of  date, and  so conducive to  waste as  in  urban
transportation.  Two  aspects  are particularly  deficient: the absence  of adequate
peak-off  differentials  and  the gross  underpricing  of some  modes  relative  to others.
In nearly  all other  operations  chaacteized by peak  load  problems,  at least  some
attempt  is made  to differentiate  between  the rates  charged  for peak  and for off-
peak service. Where  competition  exists,  this  pattern  is enforced  by competition:
resort  hotels  have  off-season  rates;  theaters  charge  more  on weekends  and  less for-4-
matinees. Telephone  calls  are cheaper  at night  ...  But in transportation,  such
differentiation  as exists  is usually  perverse."
Almost  thirty  years  have  elapsed  since  Professor  Vickrey  made  this  observation.  Although  some
progress  has been made,  it is agreed  by some  that saturated  roadways  - with almost  the same
level of speeds  - are stil a phenomenon  in cities  despite  masive infrastructure  investments
(Holden,  1989). This observation  seems  to square  with  Downs' Law.
7.  Indeed,  the standard  way  of solving  congestion  in the long run by increasing  highway
capacity  via investment  in the road  infrastructure  seems  to induce  ever-increasing  demand  for
travel. Clearly,  when  road  capacity  is relatively  fixed  in the medium  run and fiscal  constraints
are fully  binding,  the economically  efficient  solution  is to price the use of roads  differentially
by setting  congestion  tolls which  reflect  the sarcity value  of highway  sevices.  This  is not as
radical  a proposal  as it may seem. While some  people  are used to the concept  of providing
parling spaces  themselves  in garages  at home,  others  are similarly  disinclined  to demand  free
roadside  parking  - which is simply scarce road space  or premium real estate - at work places
in the central business  district (CBD). If parking  is no longer free in busy destinations  of
commuters,  as it once  was several  decades  ago, 2 then why should  people  not be made  aware
of the high value  of road space  during  peak  hours  by paying  for its use? Road  space  is indeed
one  of the few  examples  of a good  or service  which  market  forces  have  left relatively  unscathed.
8.  Recently,  the Institution  of Civil  Engineers  (1989)  and the Royal  Chartered  Institute  of
Transprt (1990)  came  out in staunch  support  of road pricing  as the best available  instrument
for utilizing  a nation's existing  infratructure.  They concluded  that the adoption  of current
deconic  road  pricing  technology  via AVI  is a viable  means  of directly  chargng for the use of
2  In the United  Stae,  th  lesd  tfr which  (pivate) parkng wa  chard  for was 1917  in Detroit
(_ckmn  and Narin  1969).roads in  London.  The United Kingdom's Department  of  Trnsport  has  since begun
reinvestigating  the feasibility  of road  pricing.
Criteria  for a 'Good' Road  Pricing  System
9.  In order to implement  the economic  principles  of road pricing,  a 'good' road pricing
system  should  include  a number  of opational requirements  Listed  below  (Ministry  of Transport,
1964,  pp. 7-8; The  Chartered  Institute  of Transport,  1990,  pp. 18-20;  Thompson,  1990,  p. 526;
and Stoelhorst  and Zandbergen,  1990).3
A.  From Users' Point  of View  (1-4)
(1  Userfr  -sjn  . The system  should  be simple  to understand  and
j  convenient  for motists  to use. Exemdy  complex  and continuous  pricing  gradations
should  best  be avoided  because  of 'bounded  rationality'  on the  part of drivers'  cognitive
linitations. For safety  reans,  drivers'  attention  ought  not be diverted  for more  than
a very short time period in the proce  of using the system. 4
(2)  Transa  y (via  a  pricing). The system  should  inform  the motorist  of the
prices  to be charged  ahead  of time  and  place, so that the trip  decision  can be rationally
made  and rerouted  if necesury. At the time  when  the trip  decision  is undertake, a user
ought  to be made  aware  of wen, wher  and how mch the charges  wil be.  This  is to
be contrasted  with  expost  pricing,  where  users  are charged  only  qfer the fact  (as  in the
proposed Cambridge  road priCing  scheme).
(3)  Anonlymit  rtecffon  ffom Invasion  of Prdva.  The system should  have
safeguards  - both legal and ohewis  - that  are capable  of assuring its citizenry  of their
privacy. For instance,  monitoring  of vehicle  movements  for other  than stricdy  ttaffic-
As somm  of to  zequitmto  onfict,  not  al of  m ca be  hieved  Iy.
4  Similuly, th  qstm shld  be rlaively st  Wa  for  ators  to impl- 6 -
related  purposes  should  be prohibited.  This is regarded  by some  to be the sine qua  non
of a politicaUy  acceptable  road  pricing  scheme. Be that as it may,  currently  available
prepayment  mechanisms  using  "numbered  account  arrangements'  discussed  below  should
prevent  fears of such  a 'big brother' government.
(4)  Prepayment/Posamment  Option for Charging.  Periodic  payment should be
available  to the user  on both  a prepayment  and postpayment  basis. For postpayment,
users  can  pay by standard  biling procedures  --  by cash  in person,  by check  via mail,  by
credit card, by electronic  funds  transfer,  etc.  For prepayment,  a user can set up an
account  by cash,  for instance,  and have  a pre-specified  sum  of money  transferred  every
time  a threshold  amount  is reached  (as is done  in the Oslo  ToUl  Ring). Idealy, such  a
Swiss-type  "numbered  account  arrangement"  which  eliminates  any  paper trail  should  be
avaUiable  for those  who  wish  to retain  their  privacy. If pre-  and  postpayment  options  are
both  offered  to the user  in a road  pricing  system,  it would  allow  the user to choose  the
type of technology  that suits him or her, thereby  obviating  the need for a potentialy
costly  system  that uniformly  demands  anonymity  as a basis.
B.  From  Road  Authority's  Point  of View  (5-11)
(5)  Enhanced  Efficiency  via Direct Charging.  In  order to enhance economic
efficiency,  the road pricing  system  should  be able to charge  directly  - as closely  as
possible  - the external  costs  arising  out of road  use. Usage  of the road  could  be defined
in terms  of distance  or time  (as  in 'closed'  ticket-type  toil systems).  Zeroing  in on usage
directly  would  help  capture  and internalize  congestion  externalities  better,  in contrast  to
merely  focusing  on a proxy  to usage  via indirect  charges. Further,  normal  traffic  flow
and speed  should  not be impeded  artificially.
(6)  Flexibilit (Responsiveness  to Demand).  The  prices  charged  should  therefore  be
flexible  and  vary in concert,  for instance,  with  the corresponding  rise in costs  caused  by
the increase  in demand  during  peak  periods. Sophisticated,  differential  pricing  should
vary tentporally  according  to use by time-of-day,  time-of-week,  time-of-year,  and also- 7 -
spaially according  to geographical  location,  route  and  possibly mode. Per contra, the
lack  of responsiveness  to demand  and  the crudeness  of the design  of a given  road  pricing
domain  could  lead  to boundary  problems  both  temporally  and spatially. For example,
traffic  would  be queued  up just before  and after  certain  pricing  zones  go into effect  (as
in the Singapore  Area Licensing  Scheme)  if pricing  gradations  are not made  continuous
and fine enough.
(7)  Reliability. The road pricing  system  should  be able to operate  reliably  under
harsh  environmental  conditions  and should  charge  users  correctly. However,  charging
a user - or even a nonuser - incorrectly is a much more serious error than  omitting to
charge. After  all, a single  erroneous  charge  could  result  in public  relations  damages  that
might  not be salvageable  (as  in the case  of the Gross  Ile Toll  Bridge,  Michigan  (Smoke,
1990)). On the other hand, even though  a road authority  may occasionally  fail to
charge,  a vehicle  which  crosses  a number  of pricing  points would  still have to incur
most of the charges  imposed.
(8)  Sclut  and Enf  . An ideal  charging  mechanism  should  be secure  at two
levels. It should  be:  a) free from theft  of proceeds  by private  individuals  and (toll)
operators  and b) free from fraud  and abuse  to the payment  system  by both individuals
and operators. Whether  it is deliberate  or unintentional,  internal  or extenal, fraud  and
malfunction  should  be minimized  to ascertin public  support  for the  road  pricing  system.
The  system  ought  to be made  secure: difficult  for  users  to evade  and easy  for operators
to spot  evasion,  which may necessitate  the videographing  of license  plates  in certain
situations.  To create  deterrent  effects,  violators  should  be suitably  penalized  by the law
for evasion  and theft. To the extent  possible,  the burden  on the regular  police force
ought  to be minimized  to maintain  an acceptable  level  of enforcement  costs.
(9)  Provision  for Occasional  Visitors. The system  should  be capable  of handling  the
infrequent  visitor  driving  across  state  lines  or national  borders  and even  the regular  out-
of-towner. Devices  for registering  transactions  should  be made easily available  forpurchase  or rental  from common  retail  oudets  such  as post  offices,  gas stations,  lkosks
or perhaps  even  automatic  teller  machines.
(1Q) 'Market' Price as an Investment  Signal. The cost-based  level of price simply
reflects  the intensity  of demand  and the  revealed  preference  of travelers  for certan tmes
and locales.  A high  price  would  draw  attention  and mobili  resources  to popular  routes
for investment. As such, this surogate market  mechanism  serves  as an indispensable
guide in the planning  of investment  and the improvement  of the services  of highway
links.
(1  1)  Passe  of Revenue-Cost  Test. Even though  revenues  are transfer  payments  to
society  as a whole, the passage  of the revenue-cost  test could serve  as an additional
stipulation  to the benefit-cost  ratio  test  in the light  of increasingly  tight  fiscal  constraints
and consideration  of the benefit  principle. However,  a revenue-maximizng  prcing
strategy  may not be consistent  with a benefit-maximizing  pricing  one.  Nevertheless,
from a governmental  or road  authority's  financial  point  of view, the revenue-cost  ratio
is perhaps  more  relevant  if the goal  of cost  recovery  is  pursued. A positive  revenue-cost
ratio is a necessury  condition  for commercial  viability.
C.  From Society's  Point  of View  (12-20X
(12L Passe  of Benefit-Cost  Test  Applying  the standard  cost-benefit  test, the benefits
of a road  pricing  scheme  (in  tems of the savings  in travel  time  and  operating  costs,  etc.)
should  exceed  the implementation  cost  of such  a system. That  is, from  a social  welfare
viewpoint,  any road pricing  instument worthy  of coderon  should  at least exceed
a unitary  benefit-cost  ratio.  With a Limited  public budget,  only the most favorable
projects  with  highest  benefit-cost  rtios should  be implemented.  ITe opportunity  costs
of raising  public  funds  or toll rvenues shoud be taken  fully  into account. Furth,  if
benefit  figures  are not available,  the technical  efficiency  of the chaing  mechanism
could  be evaluated  by the cost  per tranaction (or charged  vehicle)  - an index  based  on
a variant  of cost-effectiveness  analysis  applied  in the  long  run. It should  be emphasized-9-
that cost per transacton  decreases  sharply  with usage. In order to compare  different
technologies  across countres, a one horse shay assumption  for the capital  recovery
factor is used in annualizing  caital  cost.  (Mhe  capital recovery factor of 0.125
corresonds to a discount  rate of 8% and a project  life of 12 years.)
(13)  Minimum  of Road Work  nd  l.  To ensure as little
disruption  as possible  to an already  congested  road  network,  road work  for the purpose
of inllng  certain  types  of road pricing  technologies  should  be kept to an absolute
minimum  (possibly  using turnkey systems),  especially  during the day.  Similarly,
environmental  intrusion  should  be minimied  in an already  cluttered  urban  environment
with numerous  traffic signs and stoplights,  etc.  Trade-offs  between  road work and
environmental  intrusion  exist. For instance,  microwave  reader of AVI transponders
could  either  be mounted  on gantries  or buried  underneath  the road surface.
(14)  Provision  for Mixed  Traffic. Prices  for road use should  vary in accordance  with
the congestve  effects  of different  claes  of vehicles,  be they automobiles,  buses or
trucks.  (in order to implement  marginal  cost pricing of heavy vehicles  proPerly,
charging  for the  road  damage  cost  and environmental  pollution  are called  for). By  using
road  damage  charging  instruments  based  on the monitoring  of vehicle  and axle  loading,
the ideal  road pricing  system  is therefore  able  to differentiate  the impact  occasoned  by
different vehicle class.  These instuments can be implemented  with modern
technologies  such as weigh-in-motion  systems  and automatic  vehicle classification
equipment  (see, for example,  Davies, 1987;  Ayland,  Sommervidb  and Tarry, 1990).
Reimbursement  for road prcing payments  made  by drivers of special  categories  of
vehicles,  disabled  persons  and/or  residents  who  are granted  exemptions  should  be made
technically  feasible. However,  while  rebates  or discounts  may satisfy  cerain public
interest  groups,  they  violate  the criterion  of economic  efficiency.
(15) Hdling  of T.  Since tie  installation  of road  pcing  technologies
and the minor  ig  of the tt  instructure  could  not be made  overnight,- 10 -
the system  design  must  include  a phase-in  stage. For public  acceptability  and softening
of the system's full impact, a gradual introduction  in the form of a road pricing
experiment  may be necessary  at first (as is being  done  in Singapore,  the Netherlands,
Norway  and the United  States  (see Office  of the Federal  Register, 1992)). The final
road  pricing  system  should  be technologically  capable  of handling  the  vehicle  population
of an entire  city (or even  a country).
(16)  Compatibility  with Other Systems. For the convenience  of both out-of-state
motorists,  domestic  and foreign  govemnmental  road authorities,  it is desirable  that a
particular  road pricing  system  be compatible  (or at least be nonintrusive  or integrable
without  major  modifications)  with other  road  pricing  systems  from other  jurisdictions.
(To this end, current efforts to  standardize  both automatic  vehicle identification
technology  as part of the  Heavy  Electronic  License  Plate (HELP)  program  in the United
States and road pricing systems  as part of the Dedicated  Road In-VEhicle  Safety
(DRIVE)  project in Europe  are consistent  with this criterion  of compatibility). In
addition,  if any electronic  charging  system  is adopted,  it should  conform  to the radio
frequency  bands  and safety  standards  set by the International  Standards  Organization
(ISO).
(17)  Modularity  to Add-on  Options. If a modular  system  is used to electronically
charge  for road use, public  on-street  parking  could  in principle  be charged  for in this
way  eventually.  To the extent  possible,  and if deemed  cost  effective,  the uldmate  road
pricing  system  should  be compatible  with:  a) other  payment  schemes  such  as public  and
private  off-street  parking  and  gasoline  purchases,  b) automatic  route  guidance,  c) origin-
destination  management  information  systems,  and  d) the control  systems  of commercial
vehicles  of private  firms.
(18)  Toleance to Culture of Non-omplance.  Any pricing  or tolling mechanism
requires  a reasonably  law-abiding  citzenry and a culture  of compliance  to rules and
regulations. For instance,  with supplementary  licensing,  a good rule of thumb  to test- 11 -
its applicability  to a particular  city  is to observe  whether  parking  laws  are in fact  abided
by generally, with double (or triple) parking regarded as a relatively  uncommon
occurrence. Thus  a good  charging  mechanism  should  be able  to have  a high  tolerance
level  of noncompliance.  Yet  no system  is absolutely  foolproof  -- be it manually  operated
or electronically  controlled.
(19)  Tolerance  to Varied  Geography.  Certain  types  of systems,  such  as cordon  pricing,
work well in cities with special  geographical  layouts.  That is, a city with limited
gateways  (such  as the island  city of Bombay)  may  even favor  a manually  operated  toll
collection  system  (as  in Bergen  Toll  Ring). Enforcement  of the supplementary  licensing
scheme,  for instance,  is not amenable  to traffic  moving  at freeway  speed.
(20)  Faimess  and the Availability  of Alternatives. It is necessary  that the toll-tax
incidence  of the road  pricing  system  be publicly  perceived  as 'fair' for it to be politically
acceptable. One notion  of fairness  is fo. tle govemment  to maintain  a truly revenue
neutral  system,  where all the revenues  from road pricing  net of the system  cost are
directly or indirectly  returned to the population  of users (see Hau, 1992, for the
conditions). Otherwise,  it would  be difficult  for road pricing  to be implemented  in a
democratic  society. Why? This  is because  those  who  are tolled  are 'forced'  into  paying
something  which  used to be free and those who are priced off are 'forced' into less
desirable  modes,  routes  or times  of day.  Even those  who had not been tolled  before
(those  public  transport  captives,  for instance)  may  be worse  off as a result  of riding  on
more crowded buses, ceteras  paribus.  Thus, almost everyone is worse off except the
government.  Hence, uness toll  revenues  are plowed  back  into the transport  system  in
the form  of: a) a reduction  in first  registration  taxes,  annual  license  fees, or fuel taxes,
etc.,  b)  more and better roads, and/or c) improved  public transportation,  it  is
inconceivable  that congestion  pricing  would  take  off.  As an illustration,  good  public
transport  and bypass  routes  have  been  provided  for by the Singaporean  Government  to
serve  as viable  alternatives  as part of their  Singapore  Area  Licensing  Scheme,  ensuring
that road pricing  would  work  reasonably  well.  Simultaneous  with the starting  date of- 12  -
the Oslo  Toll Ring  was the openng date of a newly  constructed  tunnel  in Oslo, which
underscored  to the  public  the government's  commitment  to earmark  toll  revenues. Thus
actual  and proposed  road use charging  schemes  in Europe  and elsewhere  attest  to the
theoretical finding reported in HKau  (1992).s Adjustments  to the current road financing
instruments  of first registration  taxes,  annual  license  fees  and g&oline  taxes should  be
allowed  for. This  is because  the perceived  fairness  of the road  charging  scheme  -- aside
from efficiency  arguments  - may  require  some  of the toll revenues  to be plowed  back
to motorists,  public  transport  users  and the transport  system. If redistribution  is found
to be necessary  for the political  acceptance  of the scheme,  it is desirable  that the road
pricing  system  be technologically  capable  of revern  certin current  vehicle  charges.
IL  TIAmc  RESnRA  MEASU
10.  Traffic  restraint  can  be achieved  via either  the regulatory  approach  on quantity  with  so-
called  command  and control  measures  or the market-based  approach  (i.e., pricing  approach).
Examples  of the regulatory  approach  to roadway  usage  are to control  the physical  number  of
vehicles,  for instance,  by an *odds  and evens' system  and by restricting  the amount  and hours
of parking  spaces  (May,  1991). The  odd/even  number  plate  system  prohibits  the use of private
vehicle one day  a week,  as has been  done  in Mexico  City  since  November  1989  mainly  because
of its air pollution  problem  (Carbajo,  1992). Such  Draconian  measures  have  been found  to be
ineffective  when applied permanently  (Eskeland, 1992).  Aside from public transport,
government  and  residents'  vehicles,  private  vehicles  are forbidden  to enter  a cordon  surrounding
central  Milan,  Italy, during  the day  between  7:30  am.  and  4:30 p.m. Sometmes  thought  of as
a cordon  toll (Orski, 1992),  Milan's  cordon  is actually  a nonprice  one. Other  historical  cities
such  as Florence,  Rome  and  Bologna,  Italy;  Strasbourg,  France;  (36teborg,  Sweden;  and Tunis,
in  IHau  (1992),  it is SW  (di)  t road  pncig hit  most  people and dht  road  uers og
to be oompetd  dircly  or indiraly, by the  ch  _n of X  tolU  revamus.- 13  -
Tunisia  have various  restrictions  to entry imposed  on private  cars - a trend that has gained
momentum  in recent  years  (Jones  and Hervik,  1992).
11.  The  most  recent  World  Bank  Urban  Transport  Policy  Study  paper  notes  that  even  though
demand  management  measures  such  as road  pricing  and parking  controls  have  been  valued  for
some time, parking  controls  are the ones that have mainly  been carried out in developing
countries  (World  Bank, 1986,  p. 42).  While a combination  of both regulatory  and pricing
approaches  may  ultimately  be best suited  for a particular  transportation  system,  here we  op for
the prcing approach  for two reasons.  First, prcing is more  lective and flexible  than a
regulatory  approach  in that it provides  a better  market  mechanism,  signaling  the more  efficient
trips  to be undertaken  (Pozdena,  Schmidt  and Martin, 1990). Second,  pricing  yields  revenues
to the community  in addition  to the users' savings  in travel  time. These  revenue  transfers  are
beneficial  to society, in contrast,  for instance,  to society's  loss of travel dme due to the
regulaory approach  of  gating" or planned deJays  (May, 1986, p.  116).  In particular, traffic
restraint  measures  of banning  certain  vehicles  in some  cities mentioned  above  via the use of
auto-free  zones  at certain  places  and times  may  create  considerable  inconvenience  to individual
drivers  and are tantamount  to settig prohibitively  high prces on vehicle  usage. Under  road
picing, on the other  hand,  motorists  stl  retain  the freedom  to choose  the  combination  of mode,
route  and time-of-day  they  best  prefer  - provided,  of course,  they  pay for the  privelege  of doing
so. It appears  that adminive  simplicity  and political  acceptability  are the principal  reasons
why tansport planners  have  traditionally  embraced  regulatory  approaches.
12.  Nevertheless,  a cursory mention  of other traffic management  measures  that include
behavioral  incentives  such as staggered  worldng  hours, park-and-ride  and vehicle sharing
(carpooling  and taxi  sharing)  is in order. 6 Flextime  'contains  the seeds  of its own  destruction.'
This  measure,  once  deemed  successful,  would  reduce  congeston  during  the peak  hour, thereby
creating  incentives  for people  to switch  back to their  preferred  times  (recall  Downs' Iaw).  It
seems  therefore  that moal suasion  would  not be a sustaining  force  in the long run.  Besides
6  A tdorouh  mview  of uufic  rot  nm_ou can  be ford in  May  (1986).- 14 -
being  quite  costly  in terms  of space  and construction,  park-and-ride  facilities  built  near the edge
of Singapore's  Restricted  Zone, for instance,  were  one aspect  of the Singapore  Area Licensing
Scheme  that  was  deemed  to be unsuccessul  (Watson  and  Holland,  1976). Apparently,  motorists
found that switching  modes was onerous  despite the provision of shuttle bus services.  Vehicle
sharing  has but a small  effect on reducing  congestion  relative  to incentives  that increase  the
provision  and use of public transport - a form of 'bus-pooling'  - in the medium  run.  Cars with
four or more people  were considered  exempt  from charging  in Singapore's  Area licensing
Scheme  prior to June 1, 1989,  but are now  charged  when  they  enter tl.s Restricted  Zone  during
peak hours (ostensibly  because authorities  noted frequent  pick-ups  just  before the zone
boundary). (The same kind of abuse  also occurs  in some  San Francisco  Bay Area cities  in
response  to the fiscal  incentive  that is inadvertently  created  when  carpoolers  are made  exempt
from tolls  on bridges  and tunnels  or given  preferential  access  to road capacity.)  Carpooling  can
at best  be considered  a short-run  strategy  for combatting  congestion  given  the inefficient  use of
road space. Taxi  sharing,  while  popular  for cities  like Washington,  D.C., is not as often  used
i  some  densely  populated  Asian  cities  such  as Hong  Kong  since  taxi fares  are relatively  cheap
and maxi-cabs  (or  mini-buses)  traverse  along  the main  corridors,  obviating  the  practice  of shared
ride. The regulatory  control  of taxi medallions  is employed  in many  places. By  restricting  the
supply,  the quota instrument  is not flexible  in utilizing  vehicles  efficiently: those regulated
vehicles  on the road may not have the highest  willingness  to pay.  In general, regulatory
approaches  do not  prove  to be very  effective  in managing  demand  in an efficient  manner  because
of their inflexibility  and bluntness. 7 Thus, so-called  traffic  restraint measures  that planners
often aim for could be met more effectively  - albeit indirectly - by restraints on vehicle
ownership  via price rather than quantity:  market-based  approaches  are more potent than
performance-based  command  and control  measures.
7  For instance,  a policy  to restict the  paskng  spply in Boston,  Masswhusetts  resulted  in motorist lookig
arond for Less  expenve  off-sreet  paing  spaces  a  well as bestowing  large  windfll gai  for the  owners
of private  paing  s  (see section  on pig  chuges below).- 15  -
m.  CHARGiNG  FOR RoADS - NDEcr  MUTODS
A.  Indirect  Charging  via Vehicle  Ownershi Purchase  Tax and Annual  License  Fees
13.  Methods  of charging  for roadway  usage  can  be indirect  or direct (see Table 1).  The
most direct way of charging  for road use is via electronic  road use charging. The indirect
methods  involve  charging  for a surrogate  of usage such  as vehicle  ownership. The primary
instruments  are acquisition/purchase  taxes for vehicles, such as  import duties and first
registration  taxes.  High purchase  taxes and annual  license  fees are often used as means  of
reducing  the size  of the  vehicle  fleet. They  have  been  used  quite  effectively  in places  like  Korea
and  Hong  Kong  by raising  the ownership  costs  and dampening  the rate of acquisition  of private
cars (Armstrong-Wright,  1986,  p. 126). Hefty first registration  taxes (close  to 100%  of the
landed  price)  for private  automobiles  have  been  instrumental  in keeping  a lid on the  total  vehicle
fleet, in contrast  to low purchase  taxes (around  15%  of the cost-insurance-freight  value)  for
commercial  vehicles  (Hau, 1989). Indeed,  the resultant  decrease  in the aggregate  number  of
cars  means  that there  would  be an underutilization  of the road  network  in uncongested  and  rural
areas,  whereas  the  existing  vehicle  fleet  (notably  the taxi  fleet)  would  tend  to be used  much  more
intensively  in urban  areas.  Nevertheless,  the heavy  taxation  via first  registration  taxes  and  annual
icense fees has been regarded  as administratively  simple  and effective  albeit nonselective.
While high taxes  on a final  consumption  good (such  as the private  car) and low taxes on an
intermediate  input  (such  as commuting)  are generally  considered  socially  desirable,  high  annual
license fees and purchase taxes are still sledgehammer  approaches  to the problem of congestion
because  they do not address  the issue  of efficient  road utilization.
B.  Indirect  Charging  via Vehicle  Usage
1)  By Amount  of Use: Fuel  Tax and Tax on Tires  and Vehicle  Parts
14.  A better  method  of charging  for  congestion  indirectly  is to aim for  vehicle  usage  by the
amount  and  the place  of usage. The  first  instrument  to consider  is the ubiquitous  fuel  tax. Since- 16-
fuel  consumption  is proportional  to distance,  given  a certain  engine  class, a fuel tax is perhaps
the best proxy  for the awunt  of usage. However,  even  though  both stop-and-go  tWafic  and
waiting  time  burn  up fuel  under  congested  conditions,  this  method  is only  regarded  as marginally
effective  (and  environmentay  polluting).  By uniformly  taxing  usage  independent  of time  and
place, the fuel tax is unable  to differentiate  between  peak and off-peak  periods  and usage in
congested  and uncongested  areas. The fuel  tax may on average  be adequate  enough  as a road
user  charge  to cover  the variable  road  maintenance  cost  of a road  and  perhaps  the  environmental
externalities  also. Indeed,  many  existing  systems  of road user  charges  in the U.K. and Europe
possess  a combination  of both  high annual  entry  fees  and a (userelated)  fuel tax, which  serves
more  or less  as a very  crude two-or-multi-part  tariff. Other  user  taxes  on tires and spare  parts
boost the operating  costs of an automobile  and thereby  serve to reduce demand  indirecdy.
(However,  caution  must  be exercised  - taxes  on tires or spare  parts should  not be so high that
vehicle  safety  is jeopardized.)
2)  By Both  Amount  of Use and Place:  Fuel Tax
15.  Compared  with  a fuel tax, a spatially  differential  fuel tax with  non-uniform  rates  would
respond  better  to congestion.  But this  too, has  its problems. Even  though  a differential  fuel  tax
is administratively  simple,  it may result  in wastefiul  fuel-fetching  journeys,  and would  work
only, for example,  if distances  between  the urban and rual  areas were sufficiendy  large.
Instead  of charging  for vehicle  use  by both  amount  of use and place  - as a differential  fuel tax
does  - we can  consider  charging  instruments  related  to vehicle  usage  by place  only.
3)  By Place  and Time: Parling Chare
16.  One  of the most popular  instruments  which  has been used  to combat  congestion  is the
parking  charge  on 'free' public  space. The principal  disadvantage  of parking  controls  is that
they  lack the ability  to tackle  through  traffic  and they  could  actually  encourage  it, especally in
the presence  of high  parking  charges  (footnote  7).  If public  on-street  parkang  charges  are set
too high  (and  not aligned  with  private  off-street  parking  rates),  then  congestion  may  result  from- 17-
motorists'  long searches  for parking;  also, additional  trips may be induced  in the form of the
'drive  and drop' or 'kiss  and ride' mode. The  current  widrd  practice  of offeing motorists
who  patronize  private  car parks' 'early bird discounts'  before  9:30 a.m. (and  charging  casual
motorists  higher  rates  during  the day) for instance,  may not be early enough  to mitigate  those
commuters'  congestive  effects. For  parldng  charges  to tackle  congestion  effectively,  they  should
be time-of-day  and/or  location-dependent  charges  rather  than  present  market-determined  parking
rates  with locational  monopoly  element. Ideally,  farther  parking  spaces  are  xiced  lower  and
closer  ones  are priced  higher,  with  the result  that early  and late arrivals  would  select  themselves
in an efficient  manner  which  minimizes  the time that it takes  people  to arrive to work  behind
schedule (see Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1991, for proof).'  Some cities such as
Washington  D.C. and  San  Francisco  even  institute  parldng  taxes. Only  if municipalities  control
a large fraction  of both  on-street  and off-street  car parks  would  the parking  tax be an effective
instrument  at combatting  congestion  (Departnent  of the Environment,  1976).  In geneal,
increases  in the parking  tax would  not be as powerful  an instrument  in combatting  congestion
and pollution  as direct  charges  would  (Kulash,  1974).
17.  Nevertheless,  parking charges within the Restricted  Zone of  the Singapore  Area
licensing Scheme  (see below  and Annex  1) were raised substanially  above  market  rates, in
addition  to a sui-charge,  as a matching  tool to road pricing. In the absence  of road  pricing,  a
parking  tax is sometimes  regarded  as a surrogate  to charging  for the use of congested  urban
sreets (see Burns, 1972;  Churchill,  1972,  p. 15).  While a parking  tax may or may not be
desirable,  parling  pricing  as well  as controls  ought  to be pursued  since  driving  and parldng  are
jointly  demanded  (Churchill.  1972,  p. 15). After  all, not  charging  the full  cost  would  constitute
subsidies  (see  World  Bank's  Transportation  Sector  Worldng  Paper, 1972,  p.23; World  Bank's
Sector  Policy  Paper in Urban Transport,  1975,  pp. 9, 15 and 42; and World  Bank's Policy
Paper on Urban  Transport,  1986,  pp. 91-92). Empirical  case studies  of employer-subsidized
A socid optimomis reached only  by coning  dn-of-dy  road pon  with a ladmaa
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parldng  show  that  parldng  subsidies  induce  solo  driving,  decrease  carpooling  and  public  transport
use (Wilson and Shoup, 1990;  Shoup  and Willson,  1992). As a consequence,  people  suffer
from worsening  traffic congestion,  increasing  fuel consumption  as  well as  air and noise
pollution.
4)  By  Place  and Time: Supplement= Licensing
18.  The most important  instrument  of charging  for road use by place of usage is with
supplementary  vehicle  licensing,  also known  as area licensing. In principle, supplementary
licensing  requires  that traffic  moving  within  the designated  area be subject  to enforcement  but
in practice this concept  has never been carried out. 9 Hence  this system is essentialy an
admissions  charge  to certain  congested  areas  (such  as the central  business  district)  during  certain
(peak)  hours, and is reaUy  a form of cordon  pricing. Instead  of stopping  at a toll gate to pay
for the entry manualy -- and creating queues in the process -- as in the conventional  notion of
cordon  prcing, motorists  are required  to prepurchase  a sticker. Either a daily license or a
monthly  license  is obtained  at sales  outlets  such  as post  offices  and so  on, and the sticker  is then
placed  in a visible  area  behind  the windshield.  If only  one (or two)  restricted  zone  is mandated,
enforcement  is relatively  straightforwardly  carried  out by having  traffic  wardens  standing  by the
side of the city street and marking  down the license  plates of those  offending  vehicles  and
mailing  them a ticket afterwards. (in general,  two or three traffic wardens  are required  to
handle  one station  or  gantry,  as has  been  the  practice  for  about 17  years  in Singapore.)  For ease
of enforcement,  stickers  vary by shape  and color  to differentiate  the days  on which  they are to
be used. It is possible  to vary charges  by more  than  one time  period  or zone  by a combination
of two different  stickers  but, in principle,  more complex  time-of-day  pricing schemes  would
9  In fact, the  charging  of the  presence  of vehicles  within  a cordon  was proposed for London  (Grear London
Council, 1974). It was argued  that the enforcement  or personnel  costs would be less if enforcemet were
carred out inside  rather  than  at the numerous  entry points.  Ihis vaiant  is not as focused  since vehicles
which arrved before dawn, contnbuting  nothing to congestion, would nonetheless  be charged.  Strctly
speaing, supplementary  licensing,  without the enforcement  of vehicles  which have been left or gaaged
within the designated  area overnight, say, amounts to direct chargig for entry to a cordon via manual
tollgates,  to be discussed  later.- 19 -
involve  problems  of enforcement  which  may  be difficult  to manage  even  at city traffic  speeds.
Thus a distinguishing  characteristic  of supplementary  licensing  vis-a-vis  cordon  pricing  using
manual  tollbooths  is that it is relatively  easier  to implement  more complex  pricing schemes
within  two or three concentric  zones  by using  multiple  stickers  and increasing  modestly  the
enforcement  personnel  under  area licensing  than with  manual  tollgates.
19.  The superiority  of supplementary  licensing  as an instrument  over the parling charge  or
tax is that  it is able  to price  for the  passage  of through  taffic nonstop. However,  supplementary
licensing  suffers  in reality  from  abrupt  changes  inside  or outside  of a designated  zone  boundary
and also from changes  just within  or outside  a time  period, whereas  the parking  charge  could
be set to taper off towards  both the city edge and the end of the rush hour.  Another
disadvantage  is that a vehicle, having  paid the entrance  charge,  would  have the incentive  of
contrbuting  to circular  traffic  within  the zone  since  the leg of the trip therein  is not charged,
possibly  exacerbating  congestion.  (As  a variant,  this problem  could  potentially  be overcome  if
enforcement  of area licenses  was  carried  out for vehicles'  presence  within  the zone,  that is, on
both moving  and stationary  vehicles  (see  previous  footnote).) These  are what  I regard  as the
spatial  and  tentporal  boundary  problems  of supplementary  licensing.  One  way  of circumventing
the boundary  problems  is to be fle:.ible  in its administration,  for example,  by expanding  or
narrowing  the physical  boundaries  after a certain  period  and extending  the time penod(s) in
which  charging  is in effect  (as has been  carried  out in Singapore).  A supplementary  licensing
scheme  is very cheap  to implement,  requidng  little  capital  outlay  except  for  setting  up gantries.
To be cost-effective,  supplementary  licensing  - like cordon pricing - requires that the number
of entry  and exit points  be kept to a manageable  figure. Area  licensing  schemes  are especially
suitable  in labor-intensive  developing  economies  and places  that have a good track record of
compliance  with  well-enforced  traffic  laws. Because  operating  costs  involve  only  printing  costs,
the hiring of  traffic wardens, and electricity,  it is  especially  amenable to a  short-term
demonstration  or field  trial to test  its feasibility  in a small  but congested  city given  its reversible
and flexible  nature. Other  potentially  minor  problems  such  as theft  and counterfeiting  of daily
and monthly  licenses  can presumably  be dealt with by passing  newv  legislation  and imposing
penalties  that have  deterrent  effects. Supplementary  licensing  is exemplified  by the only road- 20 -
pricing  scheme  in existence,  albeit crudely,  Singapore's  Area Licensing  Scheme  (ALS), in
operation  since  June 1975  (see  Annex  1). Just prior to June 1, 1989,  drivers of automobiles
entering the Restricted  Zone were required to display  prepurchased  stickers  of about S$5
(US$2.84  using 1990  exchange  rate] in the moring peak.  Thereafter,  the daily license  fee
became  S$3 (US$1.65  in 1990  dolLars]  during  both the morning  and aftenoon peaks.
IV.  CHRGING  FOR ROAS  - Dumcr  MMODS
20.  Having  conidered the major  indirect  instruments  of charging  for congestion,  we turn
now to direct methods  of charging  for the use of roads.  Direct charging  could be broadly
categorized  as off-vehicle  recording  versus  on-vehicle  metering.  With  off-vehicle  recording,  as
with  telephone,  gas  and electricity  charges,  the actual  charging  is monitored  off the vehicle  even
though  a tansponder  may  be placed  on the vehicle  itself  in the case  of automatic  scanning. On
the  other  hand,  with  on-vehicle  metering,  actual  charges  are registered  on the vehicle  itself  using
automatic  meters  - similar  to the concept  of tai  meters  and (stored  value)  phone  cards. All
of the off-vehicle  recording  methods  are based on point pricing  whereas  on-vehicle  metering
methods  involve  either  point  pricing  or continuous  pricing. Point  pricing  refers to the pricing
of a vehicle  when  it passes  a charging  point  such  as a toll  site. Continuous  pricing,  on the othd
hand,  involves  clocking  a vehicle  for the time spent  or distance  covered  between  two charging
points.
A.  Off-Vehicle  Recording
21.  Within  the off-vehicle  recording  category  are three instuments:  1)  manual  charging
by admissions  fee via tolgaltes  and reserved  lanes;  2) automatic  scanning  via automatic  vehicle
identification  (AVI) technology,  otherwise  known as  elctonic  toll collection (ETC) or
euphemistically  called  electronic  toll and traffic  management  (BThO; and 3) a combination  of
manual  and automatic  scanning  of vehicles. Maual and/or  electonic toll collection  involve
point  pricng and hence  are es  costly  to opeate ta  contiuous png  methods.- 21 -
1)  Manual  Cbarging  via Tolates
22.  The first mechanism  to conider  is the use of manual  tollgates. This is an established
and well-known  technology,  administatively  st  tforward,  publicly  accepted  for toll roads,
bridges  and tunnels,  as well s politically  palatable. However,  manual  charging  results  in low
throughput,  with  about  350-400  vehicles  per hour  for  a toll  lane  (Harte, 1991;  Ardekani,  1991).
In contrast  to supplementary  licensing,  in which  systems  costs  are relatively  low and uer costs
are also  low because  of its nonstop  naure, the setting  up of tollgates  requires  significant  capital
investments  in toll  plazas  and toll collection  facilities. In orde to cater to the typical  need  for
two to three approaching  toll lanes to consvatively serve  every expressway  lane (as in the
United  States  (Seila  and Wilson,  1991)),  toll  plazas  require  large  plots  of open space,  not often
found  in urban  areas.' 0 The  construction  cost  of toll  lanes  (and  tollbooths)  and land acquisition
costs are all fairly  high in major  conurbations.  The opating  cost is nontrivial  because  it is
heavily  driven by toll opeators'  salaries.  Based  on a sample  of six mainlinetramp  barrier
systems,  the toll collecdon  cost  per tanaction ranges  from US3.6  cents  to US7.5  cents  in 1983
(Wustefeld,  1988,  Table  5)."
23.  The tollgate  method  of direct charging  is akin to supplementary  licensing  if one is
conpidering  a simple  zone, and is therefore  able to tackle  the problem  of through  traffic  not
captured  by the instrument  of  parldng  charges,  for  instance.  However,  manual  charging  imposes
more  extrnalities than  it attempts  to internalize  by requiring  that  aU  vehicles  come  to a full  stop
to elicit  payment,  creatng long queues  and waiting  times  inevitably. The stop-and-go  traffic
results  in increased  travel  time and  prafting  costs  (in the form of fuel and vehicle  wear and
tear). Besides  being  particularly  susceptibl  to these  costs, heavy  vehicles  also create  severe
road  damages  as a result  of stopping  and starting.  In general,  less attention  has been  paid to the
10  Sml  wonder  the  Smeod  Repot Minisy of TMupor  1964)  dimiso  dos  apohi  to wrtail  oiguot
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increased  risk of accidents  and pollution  levels  at toll plazas.  Other problems  have been
encountered,  such  as the lack  of financial  control  of toll box revenues. Scandals  periodically
arise  in which  toll  operators  embezzle  cash  cages. The  need  to physically  transfer  large  amounts
of coins  is another  problem.
24.  Besides  the manual  operation  of tollbooths,  automatic  coin machines  and hoppers  for
exact change  are also used to save on personnel  costs; automatic  coin machines  marginally
improve  the  throughput  to about  400  vehicles  per hour  for  a toll  lane. The  disadvantage  of these
machines  is that they still require  vehicles  to come  to a stop. Note that six approach  toll lanes
are required  to serve  one expressway  lane  in order  to ensure  that the capacity  of the road  itself
is not constricted  by the capacity  of the tollbooths.' 2 This suggests  that tollbooths  could be
designed  in a way  that does  not disrupt  traffic,  but manual  charging  would  involve  unacceptably
high set-up  and operating  costs  relative  to other  mechanisms.  One  minor  disadvantage  of using
automatic  coin  machines  is that  charging  for  one type  of vehicle  is only  applicable  on a per lane
basis, unless different  vehicle  types are designated  to use specific  toll lanes, which would
decrease  the capacity  of the toll booths  and increase  the complexity  of the charging  instrument.
25.  Another  form of charging  is with the use of coupon books.  They have similar
advantages  to automatic  coin machines  but the printing  cost is not insignificant. Simila4y,
problems  of fraud  occur.  (The magnetic  card method  of running  magnetically-striped  cards,
such  as credit  cards, through  a mechanical  reader  may help control  operator  fraud, but would
be the slowest  and least  practical  method  of all.) Based  on a sample  of five  ticket system  toll
roads, the cost  per transaction  ranges  from US18.4  cents to US42.4  cents  in 1986  (Wustefeld,
1988,  Table  6).
26.  Perhaps  the irony  of using  the tollgate  approach  to tackling  congestion  can  be expressed
as follows: if an urban  area is congested,  then the planner  ought  not add to the congestion
extemality  the non-negligible  cost of transaction  itself. At the other extreme,  if the facility  is
22  I am  indebted  to Uchard  Scrfield  for  caufymg  thee points.- 23 -
uncongested,  then the  planner  should  not impose  a charge  since  the incremental  congestion  cost
is nil.
27.  From  a financial  point  of view,  if the system  is installed  for a long period  of time,  the
large capital  costs of toll plazas could also be amortized  over more years.  Thus, from an
operator's perspective, this system is  more amenable  for a  long-term  demonstration  or
experiment  rather  than a short-term  one (Bhatt,  1974). If so, the long-run  cost  per transaction
is a valid index for analyzing  the cost-effectiveness  of alternative  charging  instruments  -
assuming  that the aim is to curtail  one (socially  wasteful)  trip.
28.  It would be a relatively  simple matter to implement  cordon pricing using manual
tollbooths  with  just one single  zone. However,  urban  areas  seldom  have  the necessary  space  for
two (or more) suitably  designed  cordons  manned  with tollbooths  to implement  multi-zonal,
cordon-based  pricing. As such, this method  is inferior  to the ALS method  of cordon  pricing
because  it impedes  traffic. Like the ALS, since  charging  on a continuous  basis (by time or
distance)  is impractical,  the charging  basis  is done  via point  pricing,  i.e., by crossing  a gantry
point. Unless  pricing  gradations  are fine  enough  (which  as we  have  discussed  is infeasible  with
the tollgate  collection  mechanism),  boundary  problems  would  arise  with  vehicles  slowing  down
or even parking  outside  a zone boundary  just prior to a change  in the period of operation,
similar  to problems  with ALS.  Once inside the zone, however,  there is an incentive  for
additional  mileage  to be undertaken,  adding  to congestion.  The  prime  example  of cordon  priing
which  utilizes  manual  tollgates  is that of the Bergen  Toll Ring,  in opeation since  January  1986
(see  Annex  2).
29.  Under what circumstances  are tollbooths  acceptable  as an instrument  of charging  for
congestion?  Only  if:  i) the number  of entry  and exit points  is limited,  and fi) the cpity  of
the road is not greatly  constrained  by the capacity  of the toll collection  facility  itself.  When
equipped  with  a minimal  number  of toll  lanes  to reduce  transactions  delay,  the few  entry  points
to the urban  area  could also  result in tolerable  capital  and operating  costs. With this method,
it is desirable  to establish  reserved  lanes  for those  with  seasonal  passes  (as  was done  in Bergen)- 24 -
to maintain  nonstop  traffic tirough  the tollgates  as well as tD  limit  personnel  costs. As traffic
growth  increases  along  trend  and the net benefits  of curtiling congestion  rise, the setup  of the
reserved  lanes is ideally  suited  for the conversion  to elctron  subscriber  ones (which  charge
on a per trip basis), as is done in Oslo following  a trial  od of using seasonal  passes.
2)  Automatic  Scanning  via Automatic  Vehicle  Identificatin
30.  The second  mechanism  of direcdy  charging  for congestion  on an off-vehicle  recording
basis  is automatic  scanning  via  automatic  vehicle  identification  (AVI).  As with  manual  charging,
this is considered  point  pricing  as vehicles  are charged  when  they pass a reader  kIown as an
interrogator. The third mechanism  under the rubrc  of charing  for congestion  by direct
methods  by registering  charges  off  the  vehicles  is simply  a combination  of manual  and  automatic
chargng. Since  the basic  technology  for automatic  road use  charging  has been  tested  and used
on toll roads, tunnels  and bridges, I shall first discuss  the pros and cons of electronic  toll
collection  (EIC) using AVI in such  open enviments  and then discuss  its applicadon  and
extension  to road pricing  within  a city-wide  context.
AVI Technology
31.  Automatic  vehicle  identification  (AVI)  refers  to the automatic  identification  of vehicles
in motion. The term 'automatic  vehicle  identification'  is a bit of a misnomer  since  it is the
transponder  located  in the vehicle  rather than the vehicle  itself that is 'identified'  tThomson,
1990). Thus the less evocative  term  of 'ctronic  toll and traffic  management  (EITr  ' is the
one currently  adopted  and popularized.  Historically,  AVI  was first  developed  and tsted in the
1950s  and the early 1960s  (Vickrey,  1959;  Ministry  of Transport,  1964;  Cading, 1987). The
Port Authority  of New  York  and New  Jesey spported th  development  of AVI technology  as
early  as 1963  (Foote, 1981). In fact, it was upon  the inspgatn  of the American  Association
of Railroads  that AVI technology  was orginally  pioneered  in the early 1960s  for the purpose
of tracking  raiload boxcars. AVI technology  is now wiWdy  used in rail transportation  and
intermodal  tan  .-25 -
32.  Schematically,  AVI consists  of three functional  elements: a transponder  (known  as a
'tag') which  stores  a unique  identification  code;  an interrogator  which  'reads' a transponder  and
decodes  its identfication;  and a computer  system  which transmits,  analyzes  and stores data
(Davies,  1989;  Sommerville,  1991). There  are four  broad  types  of AVI technology:
*  Optical  and infra-red  systems
*  hIductive  loop  systems
*  Radio frequency  and microwave  systems (including  surface acoustic wave
technology)
*  Smart  card systems
33.  One  of the  earliest  generations  of AVI  technology  involves  optical  means  (Davies,  1989;
Sommerville,  1991).'3  It is not unlike  bar code  scanning  available  in grocery  store  checlstands
(which  are not close  to being  considered  fully  reliable). With  optical  systems,  the coded  labels
are placed  outside  the vehicle. A laser  beam  from  an optical  scanner  tracks  the bar code  sticker
placed  on side  windows  and analyzes  the reflected  light. However,  this technology  becomes  less
reliable  under conditions  of poor visibility  (e.g., when  there is dirt, snow, ice, rain or fog).
Further,  counterfeiting  of bar codes  is easily  caried out and a vehicle's  speed  is lowered  when
attempting  to meet the exacting  requirements  imposed  by optical  systems. Computer  scanning
of vehicle  number  plates  have  been  tried  on some  French  toll roads  but still has not reached  a
tolerably  low error rate in readability. In the 1970s,  infra-red  technology  based on similar
pnnciples of operation  as the optical-based  ones also floundered  when subjected  to poor
environmental  conditions."
13  Optica-basd aumtic  car  idficaton  (ACI) is so  usd  i  om, noaroa-bd  tra  ai
envhionm_t, u  exemplified  by tho  Washugton  Meoto's  uso  of ACa  since  1976  (Arms,  1984).
1  Automac or electsc  rout  guidao,  which  does  not require  very stinget  requimen  of reliability,
curntly  uses  a mre ancod  info*-rd  tchnology  bsod an a dynamic  two-way  communicatos  between
an in-vehicle  uit  ad  a roadside bem  Static rout  guidanc  ue  self-contained,  mapping  informaton
stored in a veicle only, whereas  dynmc rute  guidance  obtins dital  map inmaton  and routi
eommedatons  both  auraly  and visuly.  i  loer maoges tafflc flow  by usn  road-side  inf-red
beos  to raumit  and receive  dynamc  d  to al moving  vewle  in (ahost) ra  tm  (Cading,  1990).
Siemen' Buo-eo  sytm  - thea  genertion of the  ali-out  stem  - has  been  in full  scale  field  tral- 26 -
34.  A second type of AVI technology  is the inductive loop system, which operates like a
conventional traffic detection  and counting loop mechanism  embedded in the road pavement
(Davies, 1987; Catling, 1987). Since an inductive  loop system operates at frequencies  between
50 and 500 KHz, it can also be regarded as a low radio frequency system. Operationaly, an
antenna loop situated  in the pavement  communicates  with a transponder  mounted underneath  a
moving vehicle.  Basically, there are three types of systems: active, semi-active  and passive.
The active system derives its power from the motor vehicle's power supply itself.  Since the
electronic transponders  are powered externally in an active system, the security of the system
may be vulnerable to external interference inadvertently. A passive transponder  is one which
is energized  when the vehicle  passes a power loop buried beneath  the road surface. In response
to being activated, the transponder's  identification  code is decoded  and returned to receiver  loops
embedded  in the road, which  in turn transmits  the information  to a computer  for data processing.
Tests carried out by California's Department  of Transportation  confirm the known fact that the
performance of inductive loop systems is adversely affected by  steel-reinforced  pavements
(Davies, 1989). While free of the aforementioned  shortcomings  of an active system,  a passive
transponder's  principal disadvantage  is the limited field  length  within which  it could be triggered
and operated. 15 Thus, a more recent technological  development  which aimed at overcoming
in Berlin for at least four years.  GEC's Autoguide  system  has been tosted on an expeimental basis  ice
early 1988 in London and a commercial  system  is epeced  to be available  in 1993 (Caling,  Harris and
McQueen, 1991; Belcher and Catling, 1987).  The United Kingdom's Transport and Road Research
Laboratory  (TRRL)  estimates  tbat  Autoguide  users could acieve average  travel bme savings  of around 10%
and a reduction  of distance driven of 6% (Department  of Transport, 1988).  On the other hand, because
trffic  is already around capacity  level during peak penods, a slight decrese  in traffic, as a  result of
diverted traffic, results in significant  savings  of £125 million  per year for London (assuming  only 400,000
users out of 3 million  registered  vehicles  subscribe  to Autoguide). The cost of the pilot stage  ranges fiom
£5 - £10 million in 1988 figures. It is also estimated  that the benefits  of a dynamic  route guidance  system
are substantial  at about £800 million  per year in the UK alone and over £4000  million  per year for Europe
(Jeffrey, 1986). The economic  benefits are broken  down as savings  in direct fuel cost (15%), savings  in
operating costs (409%)  and savings in travel time (45%).  In the United States, the Federal Highway
Administration  is comparing  the benefits  of different  route guidance  schemes  such as Pathfinder  a  part of
the Intelligent  Velicle Highway Systems  (IVHS).  It is recommended  that automic  road user charging
systems  be designed  to be compatible  with rute  guidance  sytms  in futre  Dedicated  Road and In-VEhicle
Safety (DRIVE)  projects in Europe (Cadling,  1990).
'  A prinm example of an inductive  loop system  is the AVI system  which was thoroughly  tested  for the Hong
Kong Electronic  Road Pricing Scheme. It uses a utsponder  of the passive type - known as an electonic
number  plate (ENP)  - which contains  standard  and proprietry integrated  circuits and several  ferrite aerials- 27 -
the shortcomings  of both systems  involves the production of a semi-active  transponder with an
intemal lithium battery which yields greater operating distance as well as relatively long life.
Active inductive loop systems have been used for automatic bus identification  in the United
States, Europe and Australia (Catling, 1987).
35.  Radio frequency (RF) transmission (otherwise known as  high  RF  or  microwave
technology)  forms the third and presently most popular type of AVI technology.  The system
is modular and the radio frequency  transmissions  span  the officially-approved  KHz, MHz and
GHz ranges.  Because of the higher frequency, more data can be packed and transmitted  back
and forth via RF technology,  which is vital to enhancing  system security.  At the same time,
lower operating wavelengths  of microwave  systems  result in the manufacturing  of a smaller and
lightweight transponder that can be easily slipped into someone's shirt pocket and thus made
transferable  from vehicle  to vehicle  without any difficulty. Just as with inductive  loop systems,
there are three types of transponders  with microwave  systems, namely active, semi-active  and
passive transponders, and the same qualifications  apply to them.  Further, with microwave
technology,  a high frequency  level is needed  for use with a nonbattery  powered tag, which  could
potentially  pose a health hazard, at least psychologically. 16 Thus a semi-active  tag appears to
possess the advantages  of being able to transmit large amounts of information  in a very short
for receiving and tansmitting signals. Developed  by Plessey Controls  Ltd., the ENP is about the size of
video-cassette  tape, weighs 1.2 kg [2.6 lb], and would  be permanently  installed on a vehicle's underside,
fully deserving  the designation  of 'automatic  vehicle identification'.
16  An example  of radio frequency  AVI  technology  is US-based Amtech  Systems  Corp.'s TollTag°. Amtech's
passive tag (priced at US$32.25  a tag in 1992)  involves one-way  communication,  weighs 40 gm [1.4 ozl
and operates  at the reserved frequency  of 915 MHz (with a range from 850 to 950 MHz) and possesses a
maximum  field length  of 9 meters [30 ft]. A heavy duty  Amtech  transportation  tag weighs four times  more
and operates at 915  MHz as well as 2.45 GHz (with a range from 2.4 to 2.5 GHz)-the  frequency  at which
the industry aims to stadardize at.  The three major frequency  bands used are 880 MHz, 915 MHz and
2450 MHz.
In Spring 1992, Amtech came up with the IntelliTagTe,  which uses the same amodulated  backscatter'
reflective  technology. Priced at around US$40  a tag in large quantities  or US$49.50  a tag, the two-way
communication  link provides for 240 bits of fixed and variable data storage space (such as time and date
stamp, account  balance, etc.) on the transponder. These features  allow for read-write transactions  that are
fully capable  of protecting  privacy.- 28 -
time  and  over a relatively  longer  opeating distance.  In addition,  a semi-active  tag can keep  the
power  transmission  level of microwave  antenna-readers  at tolerably  low levels.
36.  Surface  acoustic wave (SAW)  technology  is  yet another recently developed  radio
frequency-based  AVI system  (Sommenrille,  1991).17  Application  of the RF technology  is
widely  used  on those  toll  roads  in the United  States  which  utilize  AVI  technology,  whereas  SAW
technology  is used  on toll  roads  equipped  with AVI  in Norway. For the most  part, microwave
technology  appears  to have  superseded  AVI  technology  based  on optical  and infra-red  means.
It involves  no action  on the part of the motorist: he or she simply  buys  or leases  an electronic
tag and places  it behind  the windscreen  or the rearview  mirror  using  attachments  such  as velcro
pads, letting the electronics  automatically  charge for toil crossings.  Since many of the
transponders  operational  on toll roads are of the passive  and read-only  type, they are (thick)
credit  card-sized  and they are removable. Such  a transponder  electronically  communicates  its
encrypted  identification  code  with roadside  readers  via high  frequency  radio  waves."'
37.  How does  the system  work? A vehicle  is driven  past a pricing  point nonstop  at high
speeds  (up  to a maximum  speed  of 300 kph [180  mph]  in principle). An antenna  - connected
to a reader -is placed  by a signpost  (or mounted  above on  agantry)  and broadcasts  a radio
frequency  towards  a transponder  placed  inside  the speedig car.  The AVI tag 'modulates'  the
radio frequency  which it receives  and reflects its encrypted  identification  code back to the
antenna,  which  is then relayed  back  to the reader.  The reader's function  is to interpret  the
identification  code from the signal,  decrypt  it and validate  the code  according  to predefined
criteria. If the security  check  verifies  that a transponder  is valid and a motorist's  account  is
fine, an indicator  light  by the roadside  would  turn  green.  A yellow  light may indicate  that a
17  An exaUle of an AVI  system  with  SAW  tology  is Norwegian-based  Mico Dig's  Queuefree-Tag.
Micro Design's  passivo  tag (priced round  NOKIOO  in 1990  [USU16D  weiEgs  about  31 gm [1.1  ozl and
opents  at the  reserved  frequency  of 856  MHz.
I  A passive  tag (lik the  oneo  from  Amtech  or Micro  Desin) is beam  powered  and has an almost  indefinite
sev  ife  beaous it contains  no movable  mhaical  pat.  A (smi-)active  tag is bttery powered  and
has a service  Lif of about  ten yar  - which is liely  to exceed  the  lif  of a vabicle  or be ovetake  by
obsolescence.- 29 -
user's account  is low and a red light  would  indicate  that a defective  or fraudulent  tag is used,
at which time the video enforcement  system  automatically  akws  a picture of the offending
vehicle. (In  principle,  even  though  a traffic  cop could  be dispatched  immediately  to apprehend
violators,  in practice  they are merely  sent  tickets  in the mail  as with speeding  violators.) The
reader then transmits  the data to a central computer  system  - composed  of a system of
commonly  used  microcomputers  and a minicomputer  - which  records  infonnation  such  as the
identification  code, the location,  date, time or the vehicle  class  code  and performs  off-vehicle
charging  either  by prepayment  or postpayment.  A motorist  can  choose  to pay in advance  or in
arrears. For prepayment,  a user's account  is linked  to a bank account  and a pre-specified  sum
is deducted  periodically  (alongside  the toll rate itslk) via electronic  funds transfer (giro
payments)  or credit card payment. As is cufrently  done at toll faciities in Europe  and the
United  Stat,  prepayment  could  also  be performed  without  a bank  account  by placing  a prepaid
cash deposit in advance, as with a  numbered  account arrangement  (thus protecting  the
individual's  privacy). For postpayment,  conventional  monthly  or quarterly  billing  statements
can be automatically  sent out and straightforwardly  processed. Even with automatic  vehicle
Wentificadon,  the optional  nature  and wide  variety  of payment  options  would  therefore  not pose
a threat  to citizen's  civil liberties.
38.  Smart  card-based  systems  form  the latest  tof-the-art technology  in AVI  (Thompson,
1990).19  Smart card technology  is based on a two-way communication  link between a 'smart'
on-board  unit and a roadside  antenna. An on-board  unit is composed  of a smart  card, a smart
card reader  and a transponder.20  In addition  to the standard  integrated  circuits  found  in radio
9  As a precusor of th chip  card,  the  plastic  mqpageic  osipe  card  (as  exemplified  by tbe  credit  card  and bank
card)  is ubiquios and vey chea  to manufactr  - less  tha  a dollar  ea  Th  magneic  strpe card
suffers  from: 1) the  defect  of being  asly  copied;  2) low  mwwry  capcity; and 3) the requiremnt  for it
to be used  together  with  a mechaical,  motor  driven  reader  tha is unrelable.
I  The Teepsos system  is  the only  smUt  ard sydsm in opeton  s  May 1990  an Italy's Autostrad.  in
the  Italin sysdm, h  tbrnpde  - locte  in the  oa-bard  muit  itseff-  eponb  for  onu  an  d
reepto  of roadside  to  vehicl i  t  ad  operatsat S.72H.  Hence  it is over  s  times  faster  than
an RF technology  which  oprates at 91S  NHz, alowing  for added  measures  of encryptio and scurity.
In additiao  to beu  a supplier  to Toleps,  AT&T  h  ndy  teamed  up with Vapor  Cda,  Inc. to
itgrate  its 'ec  doat' smrt  cad used in baning  applicais  (which  has thie  cqpacity  to stor  fur  pages- 30-
frequency  tags, the smart  transponder  possesses  a microprocessor  which  has  both  read and  write
capability  -- functioning  much  like a simple  miniature  computer.  Hence,  the smart  transponder
is able to maintain  a transactions  balance  independent  of a central  computer  and can perform
simple  arithmetic  operations  when  activated,  acquiring  the function  of an electronic  purse --
similar  to a phone card or a stored value card available  on metro systems. 2'  Whenever  a
vehicle  passes  a charging  point,  the on-board  unit  can be programmed  to emit a bleep  or a tone
to signal  the completion  of a valid transaction  (Dutch  Ministry  of Transport  and Public  Works,
1989). The smart  card can be revalued  at designated  machines  located  at certain  fuel stations
after  the decrements  reach  a threshold  level, whereupon  a warning  yellow  light emitting  diode
(LED)  on the in-vehicle  unit to which  the card is attached  is automaticaly  turned  on.  (This  is
the modern  hands-off  version  of operating  a mechanical  on-vehicle  meter  by hand  as envisioned
in the Smeed  Report,  so I caU  its electronic  equivalent  'on-vehicle  metering'.) Other  functions
include  the capability  of monitoring  - with the use of designated  machines  - a previous history
of the record  of the transactions  made  (up to 200, say), possibly  for the purpose  of contesting
any alleged  discrepancies.  The  prme advantage  of smart  card-type  AVI  technology  relative  to
microwave  AVI  alone  technology  is that there  is no paper trail, and that anonymity/privacy  is
assured. A second  aedF  antage  of smart card system  is that it obviates  the need to maintain  a
costly  central  charging  system  capable  of handling  aU  the separate  user accounts. The latter
featurw  is a requirement - and shortcoming  - of one-way AVI systems.  A third advantage  is
that  a charge  that  is deducted  instantaneously  would  presumably  have  a greater  impact  by making
of information)  with  electronic  toll  collection  (Skryckci,  1991). (A  'contctless' card  means  tbat  it involves
no metal-to-metal  contact  or movable  meco  nsm  when  it is read by an in-vehicle  smat cad reader.)
AT&T's  traponder is said to be priced  arud  $100  with  smart  card  atachment  (Ramirez,  1992).
The  PAMELA  project,  developed  as pert of the Cambrdge  road pricing  scheme,  envisions  at least  two
versions  of smart  card technology:  one which  coains  al the microwave  communications  circuits  in a
single  credit-card  sized  unit and another  which  splits the on-board  unit into a small  card reader  which
contais the circuits  and a separate  smart  card  which  acts only  as a value  card  (Hills  and Blythe,  1991).
Here  we consider  the latter,  more  basic  version.
I  Tn  computerjargon,  a phone  card  is a chip  card  without  intelligenc  and  is of the  read-only  memory  (ROM)
type. On the  other  hand,  a smart  cad (as  used  on a larg scale  in swvenl  bankig applications  in France)
is a chip  card  with both  a microproc_sr and a nwmory,  of the  electrically  emsable,  progsammable  and
rmd-only  memory  (EMPROM)  type.- 31 -
the driver  more  keenly  aware  of a trip's cost  (especially  via an audio  beeper  and a LCD visual
display of the account balance) - and thus modifying his travel behavior - than a  billing
arrangement  settled  by credit  card at the end of the month. The disadvantages  include  the fact
that the theft of an electronic  purse becomes  a potential  problem  precisely  because  of its
nontraceability  -- whereas  if a radio frequency-based  AVI tag is stolen, it becomes  worthless
once  it has been  reported  lost (as with a credit  card).  Hence  the major  strength  of the smart
card system  is also its vulr.erable  point.  This problem  could be partially  addressed  if the
maximum  denomination  of the smart  card's account  balance  is limited  and the penalty  high. It
has also  been suggested  that a smart  card could  be keyed  in (with  a PIN number)  by the u%,r
to operate  in tandem  with the owner's in-vehicle  unit, but the entire unit would still be a
potential  target of theft.  The other chief disadvantages  of smart cards are that they require
complex  vehicle  to roadside  communications  and that multi-lane  problems  still need to be
overcome  entirely,  as compared  with  microwave  AVI  systems  which  are less  vulnerable  to those
problems. Sophisticated  vehicle  to roadside  communications  could  be used  as an opportunity
to integrate  electronic  route gwudance  and information  systems  with the smart card automatic
debiting  system. The use of smart  cards  for AVI,  despite  their  higher  cost  vis-a-vis  microwave
AVI, may be integrated  with the growing  use of smart cards in several  banking  systems  in
France  and Japan,  making  them  more  appealing  in the future.
39.  As an intermediate  step to a full smart  card system,  a simpler  memory  tag which  has
some  read  and write  capability  can  be used  (see  footnote  16). One  such  system  has been  tested
experimentally  since  November  1987  at a tunnel  in Alesund,  Norway. It operates  on similar
fiequency  and  transmission  speeds  as the  above-mentioned  smart  card system  and  alows vehicles
to travel up to 60 kph [37.5 mph] by the tollgates.Y However,  it does not have as much
flexibility  as, or the  varied  uses  of, a standard  commercial  smart  card  with  banking  applications.
s  Based  on microwave  technology,  this  intemdiat  system  is called  the  Prognramble RE  MDentification
(PREMID)  system. Using  a match-box  sized,  semi-active  tag poweed by a long-life  lithium  battery,  it
operates  at 2.45 GHz  - still a rlatively fast  transmission  rate  - and up to a distance  of S meters  [16 ftI
(Philips,  1988). Ihe PREMID  tag can handle  up to 32 Kbytes  of memory. A more  advanced  PREMID
ransponder  by Sweden's  Saab  Comitech  Traffic  Systems  with  read-wnte  capability  was  tested  beginng
Sping 1992  at the  Easen Harbour  Tunnel  in Hong  Kong.- 32 -
More recently,  in August  1992,  the Illinois  State Toll Highway  Authority  adopted  a 'smart'
transponder  system  for its Illinois  Tollway.23  This technology  has features  of a smart card
system  such as read-write  capability  performed  at freeway  speed. It is equipped  with a LCD
visual  display  for checking  toll and parking  account  balanc  as well as an audio  system  that  is
capable  of warning  drvers that electronic  toil  collection  or accidents  are to be expected  a mile
ahead. This allows  ample  time  for the motorist  to avert bottlenecks.
40.  The advantages  of electronic  toll collection  vis-a-vis  manual  toll collection  are many.
Vehicles  do not have to slow down, form queues and create congestion  because of the
transactions  cost  of manual  toll  collection.  Vehicles  can  travel  at the desired  speed  (well  beyond
the current peed  limits),  with  instantaneous  debiting  of accounts  being  undertake at reliability
and accuracy  levels  exceeding  99.9%.24  Nonstop  traffic  results  in smooth  traffic  flow  and high
throughput  of 1200  to 2000  vehicles  per lane-hour  - triple  to more  than  quintuple  the throughput
of a conventional  manual  toll lane.  Further, no stopping  and paying means  decreased  fuel
consumption,  lowered  risk of accidents,  pollution  and road deteroration  (especiay the road
damage  caused  by heavy  vehicles'  alternate  braking,  stopping  and starting  action). Gone  are
huge toll plaz  with large plots of land and in their places are gantries  (or nothing,  if in-
pavement  antennas  are used). In some  AVI  systems,  the motorist  is instantaneously  notified  by
a green  light  (indicating  a valid  account),  a yellow  light  (indicating  a low account),  or a flashing
red light (indicating  a depleted  account  or a malfunctioning  tag).  Statof-the-art technology
does not need  major  road work, as was required  for the outdated  Hong  Kong  electronic  road
pricing  technology  in 1983-85;  it requires,  at most, that a small  it be cut on the pavement  to
embed  a tiin electronic  loop,  and that this be covered  over with sealant. With in-pavement
D  In fth  wning  bid, AT/Comm  Inc.'s cigreftpack-uizd,  Diria  cundd  is priced  at
US$37  each  - about  35% ls  expeive  than  comp8ing  smat card  This rad-wrte  tg
(containing  16,000  bytes  of data)  has  the twIn  advatg  tht it awoids  the  need  to maintin a cosdy  cenal
computer  system  required  of one-way  AVI  systms and is capable  of filly protectng  tousb'  privacy
while  they  r  treli  at  pesswy  speeds. The  AT/Comm  tg  can  stor  up to 24 separat accouns,
potelaiy  overcoming  fth  problem  of different  toll  aoitiesad  juridictions  saing the  proceeds  of ot
m  acomL
Fires  bued  on tag-bsod AVI system.  as  reortd  in compy  brochures (fom  Amtech System
Corporato and  Micro Design;  seo following  Ibotno).- 33  -
antennas  installed  in such  a discreet  fashion,  the road surface  appears  to have  crack  seals  on it
and is unobtrusive  compared  to gantry-mounted  antennas.  In short,  great  strides  have  been  made
in AVI  technology,  which  draws  us  much  closer  to feasible  electronic  road  pricing  in a city-wide
context.
Examples  of AVI  systems
41.  A simple  turnkey  AVI  system  began  daily opeation at the Crescent  City Connection
Bridge,  New  Orleans,  United  States,  in January  1989. Since  it was  a retrofitted  AVI  system  on
existing  tollbooths,  the system  was installed  for slightly  less than a million  US dollars. The
operating  cost is merely  a maintenance  contract  with  the AVI supplier  - Amtech  - and four
sales clerks  and a fraction  of a technician's  time, which  comes  to over US$100,000  a year.
With about 30% AVI users for an average  daily traffic count of 60,000, the cost per (AVI)
transaction  comes  to less than 4US cents  at 1990  prices.  Due to low capital  cost of US$1
million,  the cost  per dollar  of toil financing  is only around  1%.25
42.  The second  set of figures  presented  here is based  on the information  proposed  in 1990
for the Dulles  Toll Road, Virginia,  which  connects  the Dulles  Airport  to Washington,  D.C.
Their much delayed  so-called  Fastoll  system  is a fully  integrated  toll and AVI system,  which
includes  enforcement  cameras,  fiber  optics,  communications,  baies,  variable  message  signs
and conventional  toll  equipment,  etc. This accounts  for the fict that the system  is esdmated  to
average  US$16.5  million  in capital  cost  and US$5  million  in opratng  cost  in 1990.26
2s  Usage  of  the  currnt Amtech  technology  by  the  toll  authority  of  the  LoZusa Deputmmt  of  Tnpqotio
and  Deveomet indica  a *99.9X%  eliability'  level  (thus  appeaing  to  veriy manufau  ' cldm) and
a very  cost-efficient  operaton  (snc, us of AVI  reduces  pesonnel  costs  te  hims). A  drawback  of the
system  in  use in 1989-90  is that  enforcement  ws caried out  (without  an  add.on  video  rord  sytem)
by requiring  tat dl vahicles  slow  down  (and  perhaps  come  to  a stop)  at tde  tollbooth  until  the  dectouic
security  ystem  verifies  the  validity  of the  before  lifbing  theb  ao matc barriers.  This  is doam
despite  the fact that  the technology  is foly capable  of haling  speeds  wel beyond  tho  speed  limiL
Motorists  in New  Odean  place  a US25  deposit  for  the  use  of an  Amtech  ToilTe .
2  The  Virginia  Departmnt  of Transportaion  opted  for n out-of-sight  trnsoder  to be externally  nmnotl
underneath  te  vehicle  and  scaned  by in-ound antuns (weo  DeozLor,  1990).- 34 -
43.  With  an average  daily traffic  count  of over 70,000  and the total  number  of transactions
of 250,000  (due to a car passing  multiple  toll points), the cost per transaction  comes to an
average  of US7.7  cents in 1990.  Because  of the relatively  high capital  cost of the system
(including  conventional  toll equipment),  the revenue-cost  ratio is only  about 1.6. Even  so, the
advantages  of having  such a sophisticated  system  of electronic  toll collection  is the indirect
savings  of not building,  equipping  and staffing  approximately  100  additional  toll lanes. After
all, highway  construction  cost  is in the range of US$1.25  million  per kilometer  in 1990. (An
attended  (manual)  toll lane costs US$176,000  a year - 11 times more costly than an AVI
('Pikepass')  lane  of US$15,800  a year, reports  the Oklahoma  Turnpike  Authority.)  Dedicated
telecommunications  links, although  not required,  were  chosen  to improve  security. As of this
writing,  the system  has gone  through  two rounds  of bid proposals  and should  be in operation
soon.
44.  In the two case studies,  one actual  and the other proposed,  the issue of privacy  is not
important  because  travelers  can voluntarily  participate  in electronic  or manual  toll collecticn.
The issue  of road  work  is also  not  crucial  because  a minimum  of it is needed. Besides  Crescent
City Connection  and the Dulles  Toll Road, AVI toll collection  is increasingly  popular  in a
number  of places:
i  The world's first electronic  toll collection  took place in October 1987 in Alesund,
Norway. Though  the traffic  was modest  with only 3,000  vehicles  a day, 60% of the
daily users  were electronic  tag holders  (Waersted,  1992). In October  1988,  electronic
toll collection  also started  on a freeway  in the eastern  part of Trondheim.
The 27-klaometer  long Dallas  North Tollway  in Texas has a fully implemented  and
retrofitted  AVI system  of 60 lanes for toll tag users  since August  1989. This system
was installed  by Amtech  Corporation  for free, hence  users  are charged  US$2  a month
for rental  of the transponder  and a premium  of US5  cents  per transaction  for using  the
nonstop  technology  (Roth,  1991).- 35 -
*  An example of smart card technology  applied to a 'closed' toll road network has been
implemented  by Autostrade S.p.A. in Italy's autostrada connecting Milan, Florence,
Rome and Naples. In operation since April 1990, the technology  assures the privacy of
its users by debiting  the smart card at the appropriate toll rate when vehicles  are driven
past two charging  points - an entry and an exit point.'
*  On the ACESA highway  in Barcelona,  Spain, electronic toll collection started in April
1990 by the Autopistas  Toll Authorities. A more full-fledged  system operating  on three
highways  is expected before the end of 1992.
*  The Port Authonty of New York and New Jersey switched  over from a surface  acoustic
wave technology  to microwave  technology  for buses as early as April 1988 using the
Lincoln Tunnel. In Fall 1990, the Authority  also began operation  for passenger cars on
the Goethals Bridge using a fully compatible  system.
i  The Esterel-Cote  d'Azur Toll Agency,  which operates the 250 kilometer  long ESCOTA
highway  at Antibes, France also began operation with AVI in November 1990.
*  The  world's  longest double-span bndge  of  42  kldometers  - New  Orleans'  Lake
Pontchartain  Causeway - began opeation  in  December,  1990, using the  same
(compatible)  TollTag system as Crescent  City Connection's.
*  In  January,  1991, the  Oklahoma Turnpike Authority began operating the  largest
electronic toll collection system by installing  it on 88 lanes and it expects to opwer  a
total of 161 lanes when new turnpikes  are completed  in 1992. Charges  for toll tag use
are registered at freeway speeds whereas non-toll tag users are required to exit the
27  Ih  T  spm  smt  cad tchnology  is fully  applicable  to both  'ope'  buer-type and  'closed'  motorway
netwo&  With the latter  system, Xt toU  rat  i  simly  calrltd  by te  distance  (or tm)  bewe  two
pricing  points.- 36 -
freeway  to pay cash manually  in order to avert  any congestion  and traffic  back-up  as a
result of the toll transaction  mechanism  itself.
*  Owned  by a private  company  with the same  name, Cofiroute  - a 730 kilometer  [454
miles]  highway  in southwestern  France  - has AVI  equipment  installed  at two toll  plazas
near Tours, France,  in May 1991.
*  On September  22, 1992,  the Harris County  Toll Road  Authority  in Houston,  Texas,
started  electronic  toll collection  on the 21-mile  HEardy  Toll  Road  and the 28-mile  Sam
Houston  Tollway. Motorists  who  prefer  to drive  without  stopping  need  only to set up
an escrow  account  with the road  authority  for a rentl  fee of US$1  a month  for the use
of an EZ Tag.
*  An AVI  system  for special  and commercial  vehicles  spanning  Mexico  from Tijuana  to
the border  of Guatemala  is expected  to be installed  by November  1992.
i  An AVI license  plate tag system  is scheduled  for 18 lanes of the Georgia  Route  400
atendon  in Atlanta,  Georgia  by March 1993. Four of the lanes  will be AVI  express-
type dedicated  lanes, with a lane capacity  of at least 1260  vehicles  an hour (Spock,
1990). Under  optimal  conditions,  they are capable  of achieving  the maximum  freeway
throughput  of 1800  vehicles  per lane-hour.
*  In January  1992,  varous toll authorities  in New York, New Jersey  and Pennsylvania
(known  as the Interagency  Electronic  Toll and Traffic  Management  (ErwM) Group)
issued  a call for proposals  for a standardized  electronic  toll transponder  and reader
system  for the tri-state  region, to be tested  in 1993  and to be fully  operational  by 1995
(Inside I1,  February  3, 1992). The  prospect  of driving  nonstop  from Philadelphia
to New York City looms even larger.  The consortium  of toll agencies  expressed  a
preference  for read-write  technology  based  on two-way  communication  even though  a
read-only  technology  based  on one-way  communication  is considered  acceptable. The- 37 -
New  York  Thruway  is the first  among  the interagency  group  to implement  an electronic
toll  collection  system  named  1-ZPass,  to be operational  in 1994-96  (I&nsde  IVS,  May
26, 1992).
3)  Combination  of Manual  and Elenic  Toll  Collecto
i)  The Oslo  and Trondheim  Toll  Rings
45.  The emerging  popularity  of AVI on toll roads  and the success  of the technology  must
have  had an impact  on proposals  for electronic  road use  charging  in Scandinavia.  In pardcular,
Oslo  Toll Ring  began  using  electronic  toll  collection  with  AVI technology  in December  1990,
following  a period of  manual toll collection  beginning  in February 1990.  The toll ring
surrounding  the city imposes  an admissions  charge  for motorists  entering  it round  the clock  at
any time  of the year. Having  had the electronic  technology  in place,  Oslo  is currently  debating
the merits  of switching  from  a flat toll  to a time-differentiated  charging  scheme. Trondheim  -
Norway's third largest city - has begun in October  1991 electronic  road use charging  by
daylight  period to motorists  who drive into the city.  The opeation of both the Oslo and
Trondheim  Toll Rings is the same as the pracdce of AVI on toll roads described  above.
Postpayment  via conventional  monthly  billing  statement  and prepayment  via elctronic funds
transfer  are possible. UnliWe  most AVI systems  on toll roads, the capital  costs of Oslo  and
Trondheim  Toll Rings  include  the construton of toll  plazas  for the installation  of manual  toll
booths, automatic  coin machines,  and elecronic toll collection. As a result of the plaza
environment  and a full video enforcement  system for reserved  lanes, the capital  costs are
relatively  high. With  an average  daily  traffic  count  of 210,000  and 50,000  during  the hours  of
operation  for Oslo and Trondheim  Toll Rings respectively,  the costs per transaction  are
NOK1.33  [US21.2  cents]  and NOKI.17  [US18.7  cents]  in 1990  prices  resptively,  which  are
much  higher  than simple  AVI systems  and twice  as costly  as manual  systems. 3 2
x  This rault appau  to be caistit  with to  findinps  of Hawhu (1991),  who  concludes  tot  t  cost of
isaonper  lawe  forfuU  etroncic  toU  collection  in Noay  is a thud to a half  of the  cost of a 1mn
toll  coLllocton  system- 38 -
46.  All three Norwegian toll rings  --  Bergen, Oslo and  Trondheim --  are  primarily
implemented  for road financing. In particular, the Oslo Toil Ring was formed for the purpose
of  financing both roads and public transport in  Oslo,  with four fifths eannarked for the
construction of roads and a fifth for bu3ways. Similarly, the revenues of the Trondheim  Toll
Ring are used to finance infiastructure which promote public transport, cycling and walking
Crretvik, 1992).
47.  The charging  period for the Trondheim  Toll Ring is Monday through Friday, 6 a.m. to
5 p.m. (except holidays),  which is essentially  pricing by daylight  hours.  The toll rate for (light)
vehicles weighing under 3500 kg. [7716 lbs.] is NOK1O  [US$1.60]  per inbound trip if it is
collected manually  and the rate for (heavy)  vehicles  weighing  over 3500 kg. [7716 lbs.] is twice
that of light vehicles.  (Motorcycles  are not charged at any time of the day and cars are not
charged in the evening and at night.)  Trondheim  Toll Ring is unique because most (90%) of
the users during the peak period (of 6 a.m. - 10 a.m.) and many (85%) of the users during the
secondary  peak period (of 10 a.m. - 5 p.m.) are electronic  tag holders - a fact that could be due
to  the  free leasing of  tags.  Electronic transponder users opting for a  prepayment (or a
postpayment)  option are entitled to a discount of 20% off (during the peak period) and 40% off
(during the secondary  peak period) of the manual toll collection rate of NOK10 per inbound
entry during daylight  hours, resulting  in the toll rates of NOK8 and NOK6 respectively  CTretvik,
1992). (Further discounts  are given to those  who set up an account  - whether numbered  or not
- with a deposit  greater than NOK500  or even  NOA2500 a month.) Ten of the 12 cordon entry
points are not manned and the large fraction of AVI subscribers  make the cost per transaction
of the Trondheim  Toll Ring comparable  to that of the Oslo Toll Ring.  A unique feature of the
system is that a call box is available on aU 12 entry points if a motorist encounters problems
with the automatic coin machines, the use of magnetic strip credit cards, or the printing of
delayed charges.  As in the Oslo Toll Ring, enforcement  is carried out by taking videographs
of all vehicles passing through and issuing a penalty by mail of NOK250 [US$16.89]  for the
violator. It appears the marked  use of differential  pricing for the heavy (electronic)  users would- 39 -
have some effect of changing  the driving behavior  of motorists  whose trips are not as valuable  -
- despite the fact that the charging  period is nominally  by daylight  hours only.
48.  Norway has had much experience  with financing  roads from tolls, as exemplified  by the
early implementation  of the manually  operated  Bergen  Toll Ring in January 1986. Residents  in
the Oslo and Trondheim  vicinity were promised that the rate of constructing  the planned road
system could be achieved at twice the speed with toll financing. Even though the goal was not
traffic restraint, the Oslo and Trondheim  Toll Rings had the side effect of dampening travel
demand somewhat.  Despite the fact that the per trip toll rate for entering Oslo is NOK1O
[US$1.60]  - twice the rate for entering Bergen -- the initial estimate of the decrease in traffic
is only about 5% - less than Bergen's (Lauridsen, 1990; Larsen and Ramjerdi, 1990).
49  One natural question to raise is whether a system of 17 toll stations  (which includes the
entire construction cost of two toll plazas) is worthwhile  or not.  According to estimates made
by Ramjerdi and Larsen (1991), the annualized cost for the Oslo Toll Ring is estimated to be
N0K96.6  [US$15.4] million."  The benefits of the toll scheme were estimated by using a
simultaneous  logit mode choice and traffic assignment  model, under the assumption that trip
timing, destination  choice  and location  were fixed. For all practical  purposes, motorists  heading
towards the CBD do not have a feasible  alternative  route to by-pass  the toll.  (rhus the first two
assumptions  which  pertain to Oslo's cordon system  can be contrasted  with the Hong Kong zone-
based ERP system, which is designed  to influence  route choice and the (re)scheduling  of trips.)
For the Oslo system,  trip matrices  are separated  into four time periods - the morning  peak, the
afternoon  peak, the interpeak, and the off-peak  - and the choice  of mode is between  private auto
and public transport.
2  By  aumin  tat  the  capital  cot is amordied  over 15  years  and that  the real  discout rate is 7% (beng the
official  Norwegian  rt  for  public  projects),  the  nuualized  capital  cost  of  NOK25S  million  (plus  the  adjusted
dart-w cost of NORS million)  comes to NOS.SS  million  per year (slishy  over the reported figure of
N0E26.6  million in  Ramjerdi  and Larsen, 1991).  Together with the annual  opeating  cost of NOA70
million,  the total annuized  cost  of the  Oslo  Toil Ring is N0K98.5 million. The  benefit-cost  ratios reported
below are based on their reported  figues,  in contrst  to the simple assumption  of a capital recovery factor
of 0.125, which is used as a yardstick of comparison  across  countries.-40 -
50.  The  economic  benefits  of the present  Oslo  Toll  Scheme  are based  on: a) the savings  in
vehicle  operating  cost, and the savings  in time cost to those  travelers  who stay and pay the
cordon  toll, less the dsbenefits  to those  whose  trs  are not undertaken  (hence  the terminology
'net benefits').30  The savings  in operating  cost  are based  on the savings  in fuel consumption
due to less engine  idling  time  and stop-and-go  traffic. In a situation  in which  private  auto  trips
are dominant,  as in Norway,  the savings  in travel time of the tolled less the welfare  loss in
consumer's  surplus  to those  who  are tolled  off  is shown  to be less than the  gross  revenues  of the
project. The  numerical  esdmates  of the benefits  are shown  in Table  3, classified  by time  period,
in millions  of Norwegian  kroner  in 1990  figures  (Larsen  and Ramjerdi,  1990;  Ramjerdi  and
Larsen, 1991;  Larsen,  Mathieu  and Ramjerdi,  1991;  and Ramjerdi,  1992,  with corrections).
The results  clearly  indicate  that a round-theclock,  365-day  flat toll of NOK1O  [US$1.60]  for
lght vehicles  (and NOA20  [US$3.20]  for heavy  vehicles)  is non-optimal. 3'  During  the peak
period, the present  10 kroner  toll does  not cover the high martinal  extal  congestion  cost of
NOI35.60 [US$5.69]  incunred  during  the peak  when  a vehicle  drives  inbound  to the CBD. On
the other hand, during the intrpeak and the off-peak  peiod,  the current toil exceeds  the
marginal  external  cost  of NOI3.80 [US$0.61]  and NOK1.40  [US$0.22]  resectively. The first
set of results  in Table  3 indicates  that by imposig a lower  than optimal  toll during  the peak,
positive  benefits  of N0OB8.3  [US$6.1]  million  follow  net of the welfare  losses. Similarly,  by
imposing  a hig  than  optimal  toll  durng the interpeak  and off-peak  periods,  negative  benefits
result. Thus  the annual  benefits  for all time  peiods total  NOAI.9  [US$3.5]  mllion.  (Notice
that the vehicle  opeadng cost savings  form a minor  share  of the benefits,  in contast to the
Hong  Kong  ERP Scheme). Since  the Oslo  Toil  Ring is desged  for a miture of manual  and
electronic  toll collection,  the lane  cpacity is about 800 vehicles  per hour (see Spock, 1990).
The delay  caused  by stop-and-go  manual  toll  payment  of 600,000  vehicle  trps a week  (assumed
to be approimaty  15 seconds  per vehicle)  is taWen  into  account. By  assuming  a value  of time
3D  chag  in us  cost  annml empoyed  by Randedi ad  Lam  (1991) is based an Willias  (1976).
31  Note  tha approximate  usp  hg to  be amumd  for  asonal  p  hoklds  in 1990  d par  trip  chars will
soon  be  made. Note  aso tht dio uvl  impact  of tbe  pumt  tol was  aound 8%,  4%  and 16%S  reduction
during  tho  peakot intupek  nd de  off-pek poriod  repectively,  not takng ito accoumt  the  ffdct  of
seasona pus holde  (Lanai. M  aem  and  Rsaerdi,  1991).-41 -
of NOI3O  [US$4.79]  per hour  and an average  occupancy  of 1.3, the aggregate  annual  delay  at
the toll  plazas  is on the order  of NOSK4.  [US$0.7]  million. The  estimated  additional  fuel cost
due to stop-and-go  traffic  comes  to NOMA.4  [US$O.  11  million  per year. When  combined  with
the cost of  building  the toll plaza  to accommodate  manual tollbooths  and electronically
controlled  toll lanes of NOK96.6 [US$15.4]  million, the net benefits  come to -NOK79.6
(-US$12.7] million. (Note  that the term 'net benefits'  defined  throughout  this paper refers  to
benefits  net of the implementation  cost  of a charging  instrument  (see  footnote  in Table  4).) The
benefit-cost  ratio, taking  into account  manual  toll payment,  I  18%  and therefore  fails a cost-
benefit  test.  From a financial  point  of view, with adjusted  annual  toll revenues  of NOK600
[US$95.8]  million,  the revenue-cost  ratio  is 6.2, suggesting  that  governments  would  likely  find
toll financing  a worthy  pursuit.
51.  Given  that  the electronics  are already  in place,  a question  that  arises  naturally  is whether
a large fraction  of the benefits  from road  pncing could  be reaped  by imposing  a crude  cordon
toll  during  the peak  peiod only. For several  years,  it has  been  argued  in Norway  that a toll of
about  NOI020-25  [US$3.2-$4J  would  reduce  traffic  volume  by about  20%. It was found  that  an
inbound  toll rate to Oslo  of about  NO2iO5  [US$4]  would  approimate marginal  external  cost
(Larsen  and Ramjerdi,  1990).32  Further,  the cordon  boundary  needs  to be tightened  in order
to allow through  traffic  (a significant  number  of vehicles)  to make  detours  and exercse route
choice. Thus,  by imposing  a marginal  congestion  toll  of NA025 [US$4]  (or more  precisely,  the
marginal  congestion  cost  of N029.5  [US$4.71D  on average  during  the peak  that is somewhat
opdmal,  the annual  benefits  come to NOI95.2 [US$15.21  million. Notice  that there are no
benefits  outside  of the peak  period  since  the marginal  congestion  cost of traffic  in these  other
periods  is close  to zero. The  igher  benefits  from imposing  an improved  'optimal'  cordon  toll
duing the peak  yields  numeical  benefits  which  are of the same  order  as the cost of opeatng
the  present  toll scheme. However,  with the inbound  peak  period  only toll,  just two short  shifts
of personnel  are needed  as opposed  to personnel  for 24 hours  a day. Hence  the reported  figure
i2  t iswumed  that  te cos of  uriAmnapoluaand  road  da  cost  u  covered  by th hh  gasoline
tax,  so dX  margina  exen  cos during  do off-pek  pedod  u nil  (Lasn,  1991).- 42 -
for the cost  of toil collection  is a lower  amount  of NOK70.0  [US$11.20]  million  a year. The
benefits,  net  of the  cost  of impi -*ntation,  come  to NOK20.3 [US$3.2]  million,  with  the  benefit-
cost ratio being 1.3 vis-a-vis  a base case policy  of doing  nothing. Interestingly,  the 'optimal'
toll revenues  are less than a third  of the revenues  derived  from the present  'non-optimal'  toll
scheme  in Oslo, but the revenue-cost  ratio  is 2.6.  Notice  that the cordon  scheme  differs  from
the idea  of tidal  flow  charging,  which  is in accordance  with  the direction  of peak  period  demand
(as in Hong  Kong's ERP Scheme  B).  This means  that a round  trip which  incurs a marginal
congestion  cost  of NOK25 [US$4]  in each  direction  -one  way  during  the morning  peak  and the
other way  during  the afternoon  peak  -- is charged  once, i.e., half the externality  costs,  unles
it is a through  trip across town.  The benefit-ost ratio has increased  more than six times
whereas the revenue-ost ratio has decreased by 60%, suggesting  that a  social welfare
maximizing  toll  may  not necessarily  be a revenue  enhancing  one. While  an 'optimal'  toll  is two
and a half times  more  than the present  'non-optimal'  toll, it yields  two-thirds  less revenues  to
the government.  If the current  practice  of earmarldng  toll  revenues  is continued,  then it would
seem 'fair' that those who cause congestion  are the ones who should  pay for them, while
simultaneously  enjoying  the fruits  of improved  tranwsport  infrastructure.
52.  If a motorist  were  to be charged  for  the marainal  exrnal  cost  he or she  imposes  on each
link that is traversed  in a given  trip, the benefits  from  doing  so would  come  close  to a 'perfect'
road pricing  scheme. Thus  the benefits  of road  pricing  increased  by six-tenths  from  NO95.2
[US$15.2]  for the 'optimal'  cordon  scheme  to NOK150.9  [US$24.  1]  million  for a 'perfect'  road
pricing  scheme. The fact that, with 'perfect'  road pricing  the welfre loss for those  who have
not undertaken  the trip  is higher  and  the revenues  lower  suggests  that travel  demand  is relatively
elastic. The large benefits  come  about  because  of the avoided  trps which  would  have  caused
high marginal  external  costs.  As a result, the net benefits  of the system  increased uruther
fourfold  to NOK80.9 [US$12.9]  million  and the benefit-cost  ratio increased  to 2.2.  The costs
of installing  the electronic  toll  collection  system  route  by route  will  clearly  not be cheap. Hence
the benefit-cost  ratio will be less than 2.2.  From a financial  viewpoint,  with 'p4rfect' road
pricing, the revenues  dropped  from  NOK180  [US$28.8]  to NOK152.1  [US$24.3]  million,  and- 43 -
the revenue-cost  ratio decreased  to 2.2.  Thus, the fear of government  collecting  high toll
revenues  as one moves  to a 'perfect'  road  pricing  scheme  does  not seem  to be borne  out by these
simulations.  Estimated  benefits  are just below  estimated  revenues,  suggesting  that a benefit-
maximizing  pricing  scheme  is on average  'fairer' than  it is generally  perceived.
53.  The Norwegian  experience  appears to demonstrate  that toll financing  and welfare
maximizing  objectives  may  not be correlated  since  they  may  go in opposite  directions. That  is,
a Qow)  flat rate, 24 hour toll may maximize  revenue  but not net benefit.  Per contra, a
differential  pricing  strategy  would  enhance  social  welfare  but not raise  as much  revenue. Data
from Oslo has demonstrated  that a 'perfect' road pricing scheme  yields significantly  higher
benefits  vis-a-vis  a crude 'optimal'  cordon  scheme. By merely  imposing  a simple  peak  period
toll, however,  a nontrivial  proportion  of the benefits  of a 'perfect' road pricing scheme  and
several  times  the benefits  of the present  flat toll scheme  could  be reaped  too. Further, the cost
of toll collection  of such  a crude 'optimal'  scheme  appears  to be manageable  for the size  of a
city such  as Oslo. The simulation  results  from Norway  also show  that toll financing  would
require  a lower  toll whereas  a welfare  enhancing  pncing strategy  would  suggest  a higher  toll.
Still,  a benefit-maximizing  pricing  strategy  yields  a benefit-cost  ratio  that  happens  to be the same
as its revenue-cost  ratio. Perhaps  local  authorities  should  only approve  toll financing  projects
which  pass the benefit-cost  test.
54.  The simulation  results,  which  show  that  road  pricing  is 'fairer' than  formerly  perceived,
have  contributed  to informed  debate  about  the possible  introduction  of road pricing  in Oslo. A
white  paper on road pricing  is currently  being  prepared  by the Ministry  of Transport  and the
Norwegian  Road  Administration. 33
As of Janmzy 1992,  .e  toll for antring  the CBD  incresed by one  kmne (fom NOKIO  to NOKll).
Furwher,  Oslo  is looling  into  the  possibility  of the  use  of a dobit  card  system  mther  than  the  current  one-way
AVI utannder system.-44  -
ji)  Road Pricing on a Cordon  si9  in Stockholm  and aotfhenburg
55.  The application  of AVI technology  for electronic  road pricing on a cordon basis in order
to  reduce congestion and environmental degradation was proposed for the  Stockholm and
Gothenburg  regions in 1989.  Since an electronic road pricing system is a fully-fledged  AVI
system extended  to an entire area or city, with charging  done on a point pricing basis each time
a vehicle passes by an electronic reader, the costs would be higher than a simple AVI system
for toll roads.  In particular, the capital and operating cost  hinge on the number of pricing
points and transponder  tags and the complexity  or sophistication  of the system. The Swedish
proposals for the Stockholm  and the Gothenburg  regions are based on the principle of marginal
social cost pricing, including the pricing of environmental  pollution, and the agreement to
channel the revenue proceeds to public transport and road construction. Three major political
parties reached a final agreement in  September 1992 to use a  combination of manual and
electronic  toll collection system  - as in the Oslo Toll Ring - to finance transport infrastructure
for the Stockholm  Region, with the possibility  of introducing  differential  pricing (see Annex 3).
iii)  The Hong Kong Electronic  Road Pricing and Area LiMsing  Smes
56.  An earlier, full-fledged  road pricing system on a multiple  zonal basis was conducted  in
Hong Kong in 1983-85.  Tested within a congested, multi-lane  environment, the field trials
based on a sample  of 2500 vehicles  proved that the Hong Kong Electonic Road Priing  System
(ERP) was a technological success.  Unlike the simple cordon-based electronic road pricing
schemes  proposed  recently  in Sweden,  the system  opemes on five different  time periods through
a 12-hour day from 7 a.m. till 7 p.m.):  the morning peak,  the aftenoon peak, the shoulder
peaks, and the interpeak.  Shoulder  peak charging, immediately  before and after the morning
and afternoon  peak,  was designed to deal with the boundary  problems of Singapore's ALS by
smoothening  out the trffic.  Shoulder  peak charges  are half the peak charges, whereas the off-
peak period from dusk til  dawn is not charged.  Under the ERP proposal, all private cars in
Hong  Kong are required to be fitted  with a nonremovable,  videocasette-ized  'electronic  number- 45 -
plate' (weighing  less than  a IkBogram)  mounted  undeeath  the vehicle." Some  road work  was
requied for the 18 toll sites  estabLished  for the  pilot stage,  involving  reconstruction  of the road
surface,  installation  of electronic  loops, and ducts  for power and telecommunications  cables
underneath  the road.  (rhe  direct (passive)  charging  technology  available  now is portable,
pocketable  and transferable,  and does  not necesarily require  major  road work.)
57.  ERP  has three  pricing  schemes. Scheme  A is the simplest  in design,  and lowest  in the
level of charges,  the number  of zones  and geogrphical coverage;  Scheme  B introduces  tidal
charging  that matches  the direction  of peak  demand;  and Scheme  C captures  short  trips as well
as being  the most complex  in design  and highest  in the level of charges,  the number  of zones
and geographical  coverage. Imposing  an optimal  congestion  toll  of HK$10  [US$1.28]  in 1985,
achieves  the theoretical  maximal  benefit  level  in the form  of savings  in travel  time and vehicle
operating  costs,  less  reduced  benefits  for those  travelers  who  are tolled  off the road (see  section
on 'The Effects  on the Tolled, the Tolled  off and the Untolled'  in Hau, 1992).35  This annual
benefit  figure  amounts  to HK$1,250  miUion  [US$160  million]  in 1985. The simulation  results,
with their  distributional  impacts  by mode  for the reference  year of 1991,  indicate  that Schemes
A, B and C achieve respectively six tenths, wven tenths and thr  quarter  of the maximal
benefits  associated  with the theotical  optimum  option  of HR$1,850  million  [US$237  million]
in 1990  equivalent  (see  Table  4).
58.  Since eectrnic  number pLate  (ENPs) (together  with an additional 10% cost for
installation)  were  priced  at HK$460  [US$59]  each  in 1985,  the cost  of the 210,000  ENPs  make
up about  half of the system  capital  cost  of HK$240  million  [US$31  million].-4  Under  the one-
m  The  now  out-dated  technology  wv first  devloped  m the  edo  y 1970s  by the  U.YL  Transport  Researc and
Road Labory  and ued  an do  Bitih  Rail High Speed  Tin  snliog  ysm  and  o Glasgow
Undeground  tain contol sytm  (Transpotec 198S,  p. 3.5).
IT  economic  beneft fiom  ERP  m  ba  oin:  1)  vehicle  ownets'  ving in opestmg  costs;  2) pasengers'
sngs  i  tvel  Utim;  and  3) public  tantd'  savi4np  (i  tm);  lm  dei  wdfar  lo  to those  who
ar  tolled  off  (ie., the  dibeeflt  fiom  genated tafc).  ame Trnspotch (1985)  and  Kmu  (1989,  1990)
cal  hese  amal  nst benefit ind.  In dti papr,  -net  bmft  refer to beefits not of system  cost.
Sic  then,  0t  pnce of a paive  trnnder  ha  fle  by about  two  thds  and ontne  to fill.- 46 -
horse  shay  assumption  of a capital recovery  factor  of 0.125, the annualized  capital  cost  is then
HK$30  million  [US$3.85  miUion]  and  the annual  op  tng cost  is HK$19.80  [US$2.54  miliionJ,
representing  three  fifths  and two fifths  of the total  annual  cost  respectively.  The  annual  benefit-
cost  ratios  are 14.7, 17.8, 17.8  and  24.1  for each  of the three  scenarios  and the theoretical  upper
bound  option."  With traffic growth  and technological  improvements,  the benefit-cost  ratios
will most likely  rise. The number  of trips made  by private  cars is forecast  to be 549,450  per
week  day in 1991  and the annualized  capital  and operating  costs amount  to just under  HK$50
million  [US$6.38  million]  in 1985.3 Using  the number  of operating  days  per year of 260, the
system  cost per transaction  is HB34.9  cents  in 1985  [US6.6  cents  in 1990]. Even  though  over
10% of the capital  cost and about 12-1/2%  of the operating  cost are required  for the 'data
capture'  enforcement  system,  the  cost  per transaction  would  be even  lower  if account  were  taken
of multiple  transactions,  that is, crossing  several  screenlines  a day. 39
59.  In comparison  with  other  mechanisms,  electronic  road  pricing  fares well. The annual
benefits  of a car ownership  fiscal  restraint  measure  - an indirect  charging  method  levied  on
vehicle  ownership  via annual  license  fee discussed  earlier  - amount  to  HK$301  million  [US$38.6
million]  in 1985,  about  a quarter  of those  of the optimum  option  and less than half of those  of
ERP  Scheme  A (see  Hau, 1989,  1990).40
3  The sligt  differce  in annualized  costs for ERP Schems A, B and C, reflect the fact that the capitd cost
varies somewhat  in relation to the 130, 115 and 185  toil sites required espectively  for each scheme.
3'  The average  number  of transactions  per weekday  was estimated  by takng the proportion  of those  who 'stay
and pay' (45%)  and the  total  mber  of peak users  (374,000)  and interpeak  users (847,000)  remaining  under
Scheme A (Trnspotech,  1985, p.  2.69 - 2.70).  (Relative to Scheme A, Schemes B and C have less
transactions  due to the higher charges, so te  costs per  transactions  would climb by  12% and 22%
respectively.) The cost per trmnsaction  would be lower if one computes  all the result on a six-day wori
week basis rater  than five.
3'  If one were to use the nunber of vehicles  forecas for 1991 of 275,000 (as opposed  to using the 210,000
ENP figure on which  the capital  costs ae  based),  th  number of trips averged per weekday  by a motorist
is exactly  2.00. This fortuitous  result would  make  the Ho  ong  figures  comparable  with  mul  charn
and Singapore's ALS, etc., since  tho cargs  made elsewhere  could be viewed  as a round trip charge.
no  The fgure includes  the disbufits  of those  resurined  or would-be  car owners  who  m  'taxed  ofP from
being  able to own a private  car (bocuse of already  existing  hefky  first registration  taxes  and annual  liense
fees). The  disbenefits  amount  to a total  of H$244 million  [US$31  milLion]  in 1985  (Harrison,  1986,  Table- 47 -
60.  A Singapore-type  area  licensing  scheme  was actually  tested  and formally  evaluated  for
Hong Kong in 1985.41  A typical  supplementary  fee of HK$7  each [US$0.90]  for vehicles
crossing  a screenline  (in either  direction)  which  encircles  the central  business  districts  tallies  to
about  HK$20  [US$2.56]  each  day in AIS fees. The annual  benefits  of area licensing  amount
to HK$338.4  million  in 1985  [US$64.2  million  in 1990  figures].' 2 This benefit  figure  from
supplementary  licensing  makes  up slightly  more than a quarter (27%)  of the benefits  of the
theoretical  optimum  option  and less than half (46%)  of those  of ERP Scheme  A.  Despite  the
fact that these  dollar  benefits  are slightly  more  than those  of the car ownership  fiscal  restraint
measure,  the latter policy is a sledgehammer  approach;  it achieves  a city-wide  reduction  in
congestion  by drastically  lowering  the level of car ownership  (for four years) as well as
eliminating  economically  worthwhile  trips altogether. Further, the car ownership  restraint
measure  is  widely (and correctly)  perceived  to be inequitable  by limiting household  car
ownership  to the wealthiest,  the top decile  of the population  (Hau, 1988).
61.  The  annualized  cost  of supplementary  licensing  as in Singapore  is estimated  to be in the
range  of HK$10  - $15  million  in 1985  (or US$1.90  -$2.84  million  in 1990  figures). The  annual
benefit-cost  ratio for two separate  zones  (one  on Hong  Kong  Island  and the other  in Kowloon)
under  an area  licensing  scheme  is 22.5  to 33.8, even  surpassing  the benefit-cost  ratio  of 25 for
the theoretical  optimum  of ERP - the upper  bound  reference  level of the benefits  achievable
under direct  road pricing.4 3 Suppose  the benefits  of time savings  are ignored  and sensitivity
3).
41  Note that  the st  of models  used  by Harison (1986)  and Harrison,  Pell, Jones  and Ashto (1986)  allows
for changes in mode choice, tnp timing  and destinaton, but not route choice.  Most of the effects of the
options tsd  are due to mode choice (90%), some of it to trip time change (10%)  and a very minor part
is due to desiadon  change. HeRco  the flexbility of the models  used in the exhaustive  Hong Kog  study
on road pricing does allow for receduling,  which overcoms  one of Wilson's 1990 criticisms of the
Singapore  ALS.
a  Taxis are chargd  at HI4  per trip [US$0.511  under supplemtary  licensing  but are exempt unkd&r  ERP
schemes  A. B and C.
4  Thes  numbers  were adjusted  fiom daily benefit  figures  (Hason,  1986,  Table 3) to annual figurs  by 188
days, possibly  an underesimate.  The factor of 188 was found by dividing the known aggregate aual
benefit  figure of BRP Scheme  A of HK$734  million [US$94.1  million]  (Tanspotch,  1985, Table 8.5) by- 48 -
analysis  is performed,  the  annual  benefits  for  the car ownership  restaint measure,  area  licensing
scheme  and ERP Scheme  A amount  to HA$18.8  million  [US$2.41  million],  HK$56.3  million
(US$7.22  million],  and HK$281.5  million  [US$36.09  million]  respectively. Note that the
monetary  benefits  alone make up 6%, 17% and 38%, respectively,  of the total economic
benefits. In other  words,  the monetary  benefit-cost  ratio for area  licensing  ranges  from 3.8 to
5.6, and for ERP Scheme  A the benefit-ost ratio  is 5.7 coincidentally.
62.  The cost per transaction  is conservatively  estmated to be Hk7.0 to 10.5  cents per
transaction  [USI.3  to 2.0 cents]  in 1985,  making  area  licensing  the  least  costly  scheme  vis-a-vis
ERP.  Because  of its very low cost - both capital and recurrent  - the revenue-cost  ratios bracket
the range  of 12.5  and 18.8. However,  it turns  out that a single  cordon  could  not be found  to
neatly  encompass  the congested  areas  of Central  District  in Hong  Kong  (but  could  be for Tsim
Sha Tsui in Kowloon). Thus, this potentially  attractive  area Lcensing  scheme  faced  practical
difficulties  of implementation  and ranked  less favorably  relative  to ERP. Further,  other  factors
including: the single  coarse  level of charge,  the long  durton  (12 hours)  of a unitary  charging
period, the preponderance  of overnight  parkers  being  garaged  within  the zone, and the small
level of benefits  obtainable  under supplementary  lienng  vis-a-vis the ERP Schemes,  aU
contribute  to ALS  being  rejected  in Hong  Kong.
63.  From the municipality's  point of view, the revenue-cost  ratio is perhaps the more
apealing figure.  With the auto ownehip  restaint measure,  the additional  cost that the
government  incurs  when  raising  first  regsation  taxes  or annual  laens  fees  is negligible,  given
that the administrative  suctre  is already  established.  Thus,  raising  (car)  taxes  has an almost
ifinitely high financal mte of return and rate of return alone  would not be an appropriate
statistic  to compare  road  pricing  measures.  Note  also  that  these  indirect  fiscal  restraint  measures
are crude  instruments  with which  D taclde  congest.  Area licesing schemes'  rate of reurn
tho daly beeft  figsue  of HI3.898  million  [US$0.50  millim.  In a  discuuini  Bill  Harrisa, it was
_uggted  that  dte simulaioon  tlt  for t  1991  refmce  fgus  wvr converted  to 1985  dollar  term,
under  the assmption  thst ra  me  (and  hnc  tme  ing)  ceased by 33%  during  ta  tie  perod.-49 -
would be very high because  of their low capital  cost (this is confirmed  by the Singapore
evidence)  and, provided  that the  geographical  conditions  are not  insurmountable,  these  schemes
would  appeal  to local transport  authorities  facing  hard budget  constraints. The pracal  ERP
Schemes  possess  revenue-cost  ratios  that range from 8 to 10, whereas  the theoretical  optimum
ERP  option  yields  the revenue-cost  ratio of 19-  the highest  of all the measures  considered.
64.  With the 1989  Green Paper on Transport  Policy, the Hong Kong Government  again
tested  public  opinion  on electronic  road priing under  the guise  of 'area prcing'.  It turns out
that the Second Comprehensive  Transport  Study (CTS-2), wbich forms the basis of  the
consultative  Green Paper, shows that area pricing is in fact ERP Scheme  B resurrected
(Transport  Department  and Wilbur  Smith  and Associates,  1989,  Figure  9.3 and Table  9.5)."
A slightly  lower  charge  (two  thirds)  of the original  1985  ERP  Scheme  B proposal  was  simulated.
The CTS-2  concludes  that area  pricing  is technicaUy  the best  means  of combatting  congeston
in selected  areas. Dogged  by continuing  concerns  about the potential  intrmuion  of privacy  by
'big brother'  and  accentuated  by the issue  of 1997  (when  Hong  Kong  will  be rened  to China),
the Hong  Kong  Government  revealed  in the ensuing  White  Paper  of 1990  that it has decided  to
retain  area  pricing  by electronic  devices  as a long-term  option  and to monitor  the technological
developments  and their applications  elsewhere. In early 1992,  the Govemment  bepn  testing
state-of-the-art  automatic  vehicle  identificon  technology  using the Amtech  one-way  radio
ftequency-based  and the PREMID  stored value, two-way  radio commations  systems  for
electronic  toll  collecdon  at the Aberdeen  and Cross  Harbour  Tunnels. Since  April 1992,  a pilot
project  has been  operating  at the Aberdeen  Tunnel  on Hong  Kong  Island,  with futl  commercial
operation  expected  in April 1993  pending  legislative  changes  to the tunnel  ordinances  and by-
laws. Given  Hong  Kong's  previous  exeience,  the  publicly  owned  but  privately  operated  tunnel
companies  have offered their clients full protection  from invasion  of privacy through the
estabLishment  of numbered  account  arangements. If either  of the AVI  technologie  is adopted,
Area  pricing  is a vadrt  of BRP  Scdm  B boomu it extends  the  charging  days  to includo  Saturdy (inc
Hong  Kong  does  operate  an a aix-day  work  week). Hce  all do above  alyui  an HRP  applies  mod  i
quite timey.  Th  eferec  yar  is chged  from 1991 to 1996.- 50-
the initial flat-rate  tolls may give rise to differential  tolls later - the key to combatting
congestion.
iv)  Congestion  Pricing  in New  Toll  Roads  of Orange  Counq. Califoniia
65.  Given  the political  difficulties  of implementing  road  pricing, a concept  that has gained
momentum  recently  is the  deployment  of state-of-the-art  technology  for  implementing  congestion
pricing on private toll roads.  Motorists would not feel coerced - as with road pricing - into
paying  for the use of a road hithereto  not regarded  as free when  offered  the choice  of using  a
freeway  and a feeway. As part of the advent  of the privatization  of highways  in California
(provided  for  in California's  Assembly  bill  680),  the Department  of Transportation  awarded  four
franchises  in September  1990  to the private  sector  to construct  and run toll roads  in Orange
County,  California  (Inside  IVHS,  February  4, 1991). The US$88.3  million  State  Route  91 (the
Riverside  Freeway)  median  project  will  have  four  additonal  lanes  of road  capacity  built,  operated
by a priiate firm, and transferred  to the state  after 35 years  - known  as a Build-Operate-and-
Tansfer (BOT)  scheme. With a rate of return  regulation  of 17%  - 20% cap imposed  on the
company's  capital  costs, motorists  using the heavily  congested  corridor  are expected  to pay
dectonically (or manually)  about US$2  during  the peak  and UfS$1  during  the off-peak  when
traversing  the ten-mile  stretch  of highway. Expected  to be operational  by 1994,  average  daily
traffic  volume  is estimated  to be 30,000. The SR91  project  is viewed  as the first test of AVI
and congestion  pricing concepts  in the U.S. (Public Works Flnancing,  November 1991).
B.  On-Vehicle  Metering
66.  Direct charging  can either take place off a vehicle  or with an on-vehicle  metering
system. The  modern  equivalent  of a mechanical  on-vehicle  meter  is an on-board  unit  consisting
of a smart  transponder  and a smart  card reader, the technology  of which  was described  in the
previous  section. There  are two types  of pricing  schemes,  point  prcing and contnuous  pricing
by time and distance. Whenever  a vehicle  passes  a pricing  point, the vehicle  is charged  for
crossing  it, regardless  of whether  the motorist  encounters  another  charging  point. This type of- 51 -
charging  is in contrast  to the continuous  type, which  relies  on at least one other pricing  point
to clock  in or out with  - so charging  is based  on distance  or travel time.
i)  The Comprehensive  Electronic  Road  Pricing  Scheme  of the Netherlands  based  on Smart
Card  Technol°
67.  In Europe, until recently,  the most rapid progress  in road pricing  was made  by the
Netherlands. In 1988,  the Dutch Ministry  of Transport  established  a special  task force for
Rekening  Rijden - which  literally  means  travel  accounting  or road pricing  - to investigate  the
feasibility  of introducing  a comprehensive  road pricing  experiment  scheduled  to start in 1992,
with  complete  coverage  of the Randstad  Area  by 1995.  Having  evaluated  various  stae-of-the-art
technologies  for electronic  toll collection,  the Dutch  Government  decided  to pursue  the use of
smart  card technology  in electronic  road  pricing  for a zonal-based  system.5
68.  As with almost  all other  major  metpolitan areas, the growth  in travel  demand  in the
Randstad  exceeds  the growth  in road  space. In 1990,  car usage  was forecast  to increase  by over
seven tenths between 1986 and 2010.46 The Randstad  area - an urban (and interurban)
agglomeration  encompassing  the four major  cities of Amsterdam,  Rotterdam,  the Hague  and
Utrecht,  with  a total  of six million  people  (over  four  tenths  of the country's  population)  - was
targeted to be the testing site for comprehensive  road pricing.  Clearly laid out in the
"  To mainain  conasicy  througout  this pape, I define  the term 'cordonbased  sysm'  as rfeiwg to a
system  of cordons  or rngs with  concenic circles  and  the  term  'znal4baed system'  as refering to a system
of zones  that  are not concentrc  in natr,  as with the  Hong  Kang  ERP Schumo.  With  suh a definition,
charpng  is not  necessaily  imposed  an travel  witin both  crdos  and  zonsm.  By contas, the Dutch
Govemnint  calls  thdr  system  a (multiple-)  cordon  based  system  as distinct  from  a zonal-based m  becaus
they  would  impose  charges  for travel  wiA  a zonl-based  systm (Stoehorst  and Zadbgen,  1990). This
distincdon  is not  semaic in that  trvd withn  a zoam  could  cas  a great  del of congestion,  and  that  the
dectonics  need  woud  be  much  broader  in covezsge  and  sophisticaon,  addin to enforcemnt  cosb. I
am  indebted  to  Heero  Pol  for  his  comments  and  for  providing  ma  with  the  quanttive inonion  the
Dutch  - .
m  The  72%  gowth in car usage  is broken  down  as follows:  population  growth  (20%),  grwth in car
ownewship  (30%)  due  to  _ina in incoma  and  employment,  growth  in  femle  participation  the  driving
populadon  (10%)  and  incas  in the  level  of transport  service  (12%)  (Pol,  1991).- 52  -
"Programme  of Requirements  for the Road  Pricing  Scheme",  the objectives  of road  pricing  are
to: a) reduce  the  growth  of car use  generally,  as measured  by total  vehicle-kilometers  traveled,
by 14 percentage  points (from 72% to 58%), and that of car use during the peak by 30
percentage  points  (from  72% to 42%), b) reduce  waiting  time costs by 19%, so that the area
would  be almost  congestion-free  by 1996,  and c) use  part of the revenues  for the financing  of
roads. The scheme's  requirements  also specify  that the revenues  raised  must be high enough
to repay several  privately-financed  tunnels,  and that excess  road pricing  revenues  should  be
transferred  back  to the motodrist  somehow,  such  as in the form of a reduction  in annual  vehicle
ownership  taxes. In addition,  the  attributes  of a 'good' road  pricing  system  (including  enhanced
efficiency,  flexibility,  simplicity,  transparency,  privacy,  reliability,  security  and enforcement,
Prepayment  option,  occasional  visitor  handling,  minimal  road work, compatibility,  and passing
both benefit-ost and revenue-cost  tests, (as listed  in Table  2) are almost  all laid down  in the
general  requirements  of the Dutch  scheme  and are mostly  met  with  smart  card  technology.  Even
the document  for  the functional  design  specification  for  an automatic  charging  system  spells  out
the  performance  cifications  in some  detail  (Intercai,  1989). Specification  particulars  include
the need  for the system  to handle: a) normal  taffc  flow  and speeds  (from O  to 160  kph for a
maximum  of six  undivided  lanes;  b) normal  road capacity  of 2000-2400  vehicles  per lane-hour;
c) a tansmission error rate of less than one in a million;  d) a  ransmission  speed for the
communications  link exceeding  100  Kbits  per second  (achievable  by microwave  technology  in
the GHz range);  and e) a smart  card that has sufficient  memory  capacity  to store at least 200
transatons.
69.  The charges  were designed  to be Pfl3 [US$1.65]  per passage  during  the peak  hours of
8:30 - 9:30 am.  and 4:00 - 6:30 p.m. and 1fl.30  [US$0.16]  during off-peak hours.4 7 The
effects  of road  pricing  during  peak-hours  for the reference  year of 2010  are: a) the decrease  in
total  kllometers  traveled  of 80% (due  to suppressed  trips, shorter  trips  and trips undertaken  to
alterative desnations); b) a rescheduling  of trips to off-peak  hours  of 5%; and c) a change  in
4?  For  tinmwof-dy  piding,  odh shmes  such  as eing somo  odier  penods  at  half  the  peak  charges  were  also
bed ouL-53  -
mode  of 15%. The  rvenues are esimated  to be  Dp300 [US$165]  million  per year. From  1992
to 2010,  the time  savings  amount  to DfllO1,000  [US$5,495]  million  for those  who  are tolled  and
the loss of surplus  amounts  to 1Df440  (US$242]  million  for those  who are tolled  off the road
(and on to public  trsport,  say). Thus the benefits  come  to pfl9,560 [US$5,253]  million  in
present  value  terms  in 1992. With  the total  system  cost  of D,fl2,200  [US$1,209]  million  for the
18-year  period,  the  net benefits  are  Dif7,360  (US$4,044]  million  and the  benefit-cost  ratio  is 4.3.
Also estimated  are external  benefits  such as a decrease  in road maintenance  costs of 1D1450
[US$247]  million  and environmental  benefits  valued  at Dpfl400  [US$220]  million. If one were
to include  these  other  extnal  costs  and benefits  (heretofore  not  included  in other  schemes  such
as Oslo  Toil Ring),  the social  benefits  come  to lfl10,850 (US$5,962]. Extnal  costs were
estimated  to include  an increase  in the public transport  subsidy  of Dif700 [US$3851  million,
migraion cost  of Dfl700 [US$3851  and prosperity  losses of P172,000  [US$1,099]  million.
Thus,  the social  net benefits  come  to P174,810  [US$2,643]  million  and the social  benefit-cost
ratio is 3.2.4
70.  For purposes  of comparison  with the other charging mechanisms  presented  here,
conversion  to annualized  figures  is nessary.  The  capital  cost  for implemenig the smart  card
technology  is estimated  to be  f17500  million  in 1991, which is equivalent  to an annualized
capital  cost of Dfl62.5  [US$33.3]  million  in 1990  figures. 4 9  Since  the annual  opating  costs
are estimated  to be D1f55  million  in 1991,  the total atnmalized osts (including  enforcement
costs)  amount  to lfl117.5 million  in 1991  [US$62.68  million  in 1990  figures]. With the total
number  of tansactions  esimated to be 500 million  per year in the full  Randstad  area, the cost
per tranction  comes  to roughly  Df1O.24  in 1991  [US12.S  cents  in 1990  figures]. Thus  the cost
T e social  net  beefit-cost raio is 2.2.  In our contea  th  reeat  compa_son  of banefit-cost  rto
requie  dht the syshm  co  of alterAive  congeto  dcarg  mchansm  be placod n  e denomnator
nd al  otr  cost  be counted  a  nvgow  bmfit  i  the  umeao.  Heo  pol  Dutc  Miniy  of
Tnsport  and PubLic  Works,  estima  tht  ho cost  per  ansaction  of AVI  and sat  card  btchnology  ae
approximately  th  same
The capital  coob include  to  emated  cot of 4 to 5 million  sat  card.  I am  rtefiu to Heo  Pol,
Chairma, Toll Collon  Proct,  for poviding  t  above  figr  and  for his insightful  comnunts  an the
chargg  mechanisms  (soe  P,  1992).- 54 -
per transaction  is on the order of twice  the cost of the scheme  for Hong Kong,  reflecting  the
higher  cost  of microelectronics  of a two-way  smart  card system  vis-a-vis  a one-way  tag-based
system.  The annualized  benefits  from  time  savings  of those  tolled,  net of the  disbenefits  of those
tolled  off, are about  DflS30.6  million  per year [or US$283.0  million  in 1990  figures],  with  an
annual  benefit-cost  ratio  of 4.5, which  is close  enough  to our previous  benefit-cost  ratio  of 4.3
calculated  using  total figures.
71.  As opposed  to road pricing,  one could  attempt  to reduce  congestion  by the unpalatable
alternative  of constructing  roads, at a cost of Dfl3O  [US$16.5]  billion, up till the year 2010
(Ministry  of Transport  and Public  Works, 1989). The revenue-cost  ratio of electronic  road
pricing  using  smart  card technology  is estimated  to be 2.6, and the toll  revenues  collected  would
help  alleviate  the  pressing  demands  for  road  construction  somewhat.  Nevertheless,  even  though
the  Dutch  Government  made  a policy  decision  in 1988  to introduce  a comprehensive  road  pricing
scheme  for the Netherlands  for the period 1992  to 1996,  the scheme  floundered  on political
grounds  (Catling,  1990). Apparently,  the  dedication  of toll  revenues  did not sufficiently  assuage
the car lobby's fear that this might  be yet another  revenue-raising  device  on the part of the
government.  Further,  smart  card technology  requiring  two-way  radio  communications  was  not
considered  sophisticated  enough  in 1990  to warrant  a go-ahead  for the road pricing  scheme.A'
Thereafter,  the Dutch  Government  had  chosen  to reduce  the scale  of the first  phase  of the road
pricing  project  by limiting  it to electronic  toll collection  at the tunnels  under the Project  Toll
Ring. On April  27, 1992,  the Minister  of Transport  announced  that  a system  of supplementary
licensing  will be instituted  for motorists  using  the main  road network  dunng the peak penod
instead. It is expwected  that  eight  tenths  of the motorists  would  purchase  seasonal  passes,  but the
use of seasonal  passes  may  dampen  the desired  effects  (as discussed  before  in Annex  2).
s  One of the speifications  sought for a smart card  is that  it  hould  contan at lea  200 tanctons,  where
art  cards  produced  for a large  French bankg  system  at the timo  could  only contan 175 trnsctons,
even befre  conideing  the ran  dr  componet required  for idenfyi  objecsb  which r  in motion
(nteai,  1989).- 55  -
iJ)wiCogesion  Metering  in Cambridge,  England
72.  Cambridge,  England  is currently  in the design  stage  of a road  pricing  scheme  based  on
smart card technology. A prototype  on-board  unit (transponder  plus smart card) - and its
miniaturized  version  -- is currently  being developed  as part of the Pricing  And Monitoring
ELectronicaly  of Automobiles  (PAMELA)  project, which is one of the projects under the
European  Community's  Dedicated  Road Inftastructure  for VEhicle  Safety  (DRIVE)  research
programme 5l.  Full scale  field  trials  are expected  to begin  in 1993-94,  with public  consultation
to be sought  in 1995-96  for a decision  of whether  to go ahead  with road pricing  or not.
73.  The scheme  works  as follows. A cordon  is placed  around  the City of Cambridge  and
beacons  are strategically  installed  at 17  radial  roads  which  fully  control  the gateway  to the city.
Whenever  an automobile  equipped  with an on-board  unit containig a valid smart card passes
a roadside  beacon  when  'congestion'  occurs,  a 'congestion  unit' of 20 pence  [US36  cents],  say,
is debited  electronically  on the smart  card (Oldridge,  1990). Simultaneously,  trffic information
by lane is also collected  by a real-time  data-concentrator,  which aids in monitoring  the
congestion  situation.  However,  the key  difference  between  the Cambridge  road  pricing  concept
and all other  road pricing  systems  is that the former  is based  on cc  post pricing  and the latter
on er ante pricing.  Congestion  charging,  in this case, is applied  literally  - as and when
congestion  occurs,  without  any prior notification  - regardless  of whether  avenues  of escape  are
available  at a congested  botdeneck. When  an equipped  automobile  enters  the city during  the
peak  hours,  the in-vehicle  unit is tiggered on and is turned  off only  upon  exit or whenever  the
engine  is shut  off.  Thus the Cambridge  system  is based  on continwus  pricing  rather than on
point pricing, which was the basis of the Dutch smart card system and most other AVI
systems.' 2 A  'congestion  unit' is debited on a  smart card when one of  the following
Si  A microwave  c  caions  link using a 2.45 GHz bs  e 1qutly  was already tosted  at
Nowcasde  in 1990  (Hills  and Blytho,  1990;  Blyth and Hlls, 1991; horpe and  Hills, 1991).
52  A similar  device  caled Timezone,  which  chages for congestion  an a continuous  pricing  bais,  is designed
by GEC-Mco.  TI  tial for tesing dlo dec  equpment  a  to begin  in the Landon  Burfough  of
Richmond  in 1991.-56 -
provisional  conditions  defining  'congestion'  is met: the thehold  of a pro-specfed speed  (e.g.
6 mph within  a third of a mile  or 3 minutes  for every  half klHometer  is reached;  or more than
four stops  are undertalen  within  a third of a mile)."  Even though  ex ante  pricing  is on an
xpected  congestion ter  than  acnt congesdon  basis,  it is connstent  with  the  dictum  that  price
signals  be made  known  to the consumer-traveler  beforehand,  with  the objective  of transmitting
scarcity  values  to the rational  consumer  and the aim  of impacting  modal  split. While  the smart
card component  assures  privacy,  ex post  congesion-based  pricing  does not affect or modify
travel  behavior  as effectively  as or ante  pricing  would.-"
74.  The plan  by the Cambridgeshire  County  Council  is to distibute on-board  units  with  the
transponder  free  of charge  to regular  users, whereas  occasional  visitors  to the city will  have  to
pick up daily  passes  from automatic  machines  at the entrances  to the city. The revenues  from
congestion  charging  are  earmarked  to improve  public  transport,  for  instance,  by the constructio
of a light  rail transit  system. While  it is unclear  at pent  whether  this demonstrion project
will  eventually  be implemented,  the Secretary  of Tansport in the United  Kingdom  has decided
that  London's  congesdon  situaton has  become  intoleable. The U.K Deparment  of Tansport
has therefore  commissoned  MVA Consultancy  to embark  on a three-year  study  beginning
November  1991  on mainly  electronic  approaches  to tcking  congeston  in London. Ohr  cities
such  as Edinburgh  are also  investgating  the feasibility  of charging  for congestion  by electronic
or other  means. Quite  a few  are convinced  that  it is only  a matter  of time before  electronic  road
pricing  becomes  a reality  in Europe.
5  At tO tim of this wring, Bzisn  OlMdp inf  e  adtoor  tat  do City  of Camdg  hs  abdoed
the  lar  dau  cdariatn Still,  it is possible  ta  problamswi safety my ara  if vidcla  reduce  dmei
tandeiy  to ap  at pedesrian  osig  in  rdr  to attain an aveng  tsold  speed.
54  One  of the  inteeti  ap  about  do oia  popoa  is  hat  whenever  t  stord valu of a  mnat  cad
expires  and  a vicl's  engine  is und  off for marn  th  a mint  the qfgi  electrnics (or g  supply)
is cut off for efocmen  purposel  This  is doe  to enso tht  -e  rechap  thir smat card at filling
statis,  f  insan.  Although  t  woul  redude  d  cost of erment  to society, his ttic  may
possbly  pose  u  an u_neea  hudle to poliical  implaintation- 57  -
i)  The Sin  e  Road  Pricing  System
75.  Finally, it is worth mentioning  that Singapore  - the pioneer in road pricing - ha  tas  en
the bold step of upgrading  its simple  labor-intensive  area licensing  scheme into a capital-
intensive  electronic  road pricing  system,  to be operational  by 1995. The initial  goal is to tum
the 26 manually  controled  gantry  points  of the ALS  into  electronically  controlled  ones, with  the
intention  of eventually  turning  the scheme  into  a more  sophisticated  BRP  system. After  inviting
tenders for both an AVI and smart card system,  authorities  have now adopted  smart card
technology  as the basis  of their  electronic  road  pricing  system.  In response  to the government's
first call for tenders,  about  30 intnational companies  submitted  proposals,  with five finalists
being  chosen.  The  installation  cost,  including  an electrnic enforcement  system,  in the  mid-price
range,  is S$80  [US$44.2]  million  and a five-year  maintenance  contract  is about  S$21  [US$11.6J
million.  Assuming  that budget  authorities  act conservatively  and aim for this median  bid, the
cost  per transaction  is S72.7  cents  [US40.2  cents],  under  the assumption  that  the morning  (7:30  -
10:15  a.m.) and afternoon  (4:30  - 6:30  p.m.) peak  trffic volumes  still remain  at the level of
69,000  in 1990 (Public  Works Department, 1990).-M  On the  other hand, if the current average
daily traffic count  of 300,000  during  the day (6 am.  - 8 p.m.) is used  when  electronic  road
pricing  becomes  more encompassing,  the cost per tranaction is S16.7 cents [US9.2  cents].J7
The  capital  costs  include  the costs  of smart  card units  for 520,000  automobiles.  Vehicla from
foreign  countres are not exempt  from ERP and those  who  intend to drive into the Resticted
Zone  during  peak hours are expected  to obtain  temporary  tags at commisioning  stations  for
M  Ibc bids  for Xi inatallcostAs  rg  fiom  a low  of S441  [US$22.7]  million  (by  Phiips) for  a simple  AVI
system  to a high of S$164  [US$90.61  million  (by dIjoint  vulture of United  Engineers  and Vapor Canada,
Inc.) for a sophistcated  mit  cad sysem, with  numos  add-on  optio.  Th  bid submited  by United
Egineers and Vapor  Canda,  ic., for a mor basdc mrt card  sydem  ws  $98 [US$54.  11  million The
five-year  mantuance contac  for asc comes  to $13 [US$7.2]  and S$14  [US$7.71  respectively  in 1990
figue.
I  Tho  number  of opwating  days  in the  you is asumed to ba 283, u with  ALS. Th corresponding  cost per
transaction for the low and bigh bids we S39.6 cents [US2l.9 cas]  and S119.3 cents [U365.9 cents]
respectively.
T'  h  coresondinS co  per trncio  for tho low  ad  high bids  Sm.1  S  cents  [[U5.0  culnts  and S27.4
cents (USS3.2  cents]  epetivdy.-58  -
foreign vehicles.  Due to the stringent  performance  specifications  set by the Singapore
Government,  the wide variation  in the submitted  bids, and apparent  failure  to agree on the
commercial  terms of the lucrative  market  between  the negotiating  parties, new tenders  were
sought  in March 1992 based on revised  specifications  for a smart card system.  Work is
expected  to begin  on BERP  in Singapore  by the end of this year.- 59  -
V.  SUMMARY  AM CONCLUONS
76.  The gamut  of indirect  and direct  congestion  charging  mechanisms  has been  reviewed
here.  Indirect  charges  via vehicle  ownership  such  as a purchase  tax and annual  license  fees
suppress  worthwhile  trips  in uncongested  areas  and are considered  sledgehammer  approaches  to
dealing  with  congestion.  Charges  imposed  indirectly  on the amount  of vehicle  use via the fuel
tax fail to differentiate  road use between  congested  and uncongested  times and places.  A
parking  charge,  by nature, can deal  only with stationary  vehicles  and fails to tackle  through
traffic. Also, it is likely  that too large  a discrepancy  between  public  on-street  parking  charges
vis-a-vis  prvate off-street  parking rates would exacerbate  the congestion  situation  further,
especialy  when  vehicles  cruise  around  in search  of cheaper  parking  places. However,  in many
downtown  areas  where  employer-subsidized  parking  prevails,  parking  pricing  could  serve  as a
vital complementary  measure  to road pricing. What remains  are essentially  four congestion
pricing  instruments: supplementary  vehicle  licensing,  cordon  pricing  via manual  tollbooths,
direct  charging  via automatic  vehicle  identification  (AVI)  and smart  card technology.  Each of
these  instruments  is dealt  with  by an in-depth  case study  analysis.
77.  Although  supplementary  licensing  is clasified as indirect  charging  in Table  1, it can  be
thought  of as cordon  pricing  applied  directly  to vehicles  which  are in motion,  with  the possible
option  of undertaking  multiple  entries  (see  footnote  9).  Even  though  manual  and electronic  toll
collection  mechanisms  are not charging  instruments  per se, they  do form  the rudiments  of cordon
pricing  via manual  tollgates  and electronic  road  pricing  via AVI  and smart  card technologies,
and hence  are summarized  alongside  the four  charging  instruments  in Table  5.  (The  grouping
of the criteria  for choosing  a technology  vis-a-vis  the others  is based  on the perspective  of:  the
road user, the road authority  and society. A charging  instrument  is evaluated  on each of the
twenty  criteria  on the basis  of a 'high' (coded  by a white  box), 'medium'  (black  and white  box)
or 'low' (black  box)  ranking  as it pertains  to the specific  illustrative  case study. Because  of the
potentially  divergent  objectives  of the different  parties,  an unequivocal  result  of one instrument
dominating  another  is unlikely  to emerge.)-60-
78.  Tollbooth s-ffer from being  land intensive,  labor intensive  (due to the hiring of toll
operators)  and time intensive  (due to the queuing  delay to motorists),  and are not ideal for
congestion  charging  in and of themselves.  The  process  of stopping  and paying  disrupts  taffic
flow and lengthens  queues,  defeating  the ultimate  goal of alleviating  congestion. However,
cordon  prcing as in the  Bergen  Toll  Ring  could  serve  as an effective  instrument  of charging  for
congestion  since  half the toll  lanes  are reserved  for the use of seasonal  pass holders  who travel
through  the pricing  points  at regular  highway  speeds. Enforcement  of those  driving  on reserved
lanes  is carried  out by periodic  videographs  of vehicle  license  plates,  just as radar technology
is a socially  acceptable  tool  to catch  speedsters.  The  are  licensing  scheme  (AU)  requires  that
vehicles  entering  the central business  district  during  peak hours display  a monthy or daily
license  prominently,  with  enforcement  being  underta  at gantry  points  by traffic  wardens  who
perform  visual  checks  on the nonstop  trffic.  Enforcement  of ALS  would  be prohibitively  costly
when  carried  out at motorway  speeds  but would  likely  involve  relatively  low cost  in a standard
congested  urban  environment  with  Limited  entry  and exit points. As a measure  of the technical
efficiency  of a system,  consider  the  long-run  cost  of opeating a congestion  charging  mechanism,
which  includes  amorfized  capital  and operating  costs. Based  on a variant  of cost-effectiveness
analysis,  the cost  per transaction  is then used  as an index  of comparison  among  technologies:
i  indicates  that supplementary  licensing  is the lowest,  even  lower  than that of cordon  pricing
as in Bergen. The Oslo  Toll Ring is designed  for the purpose  of eJonic  and manual  MU
*-3i=ion, and the construction  of large  toll  plazas  accommodatig  both  involves  relatively  high
capital  cost. (Note  also  that a flat  rate, 24-hour  toll  used  by a (standard)  manual  and electronic
toll  collection  system  such  as Oslo's  is not  welfare  enhancing.  The use  of such  a system  would
improve  social  welfare  if a differential  pricing  stategy were adopted  by simply  implementing
a crude peak period toll).  However,  merely  retrofitting  an  isting toll plaz  setting  with
electronic  toll equipment  would  not involve  high  capital  cost, as the Crescent  City Connection
case clearly  demonstrates.  By  the same  token,  electonic road yiing .3RP)  is thus  electronic
toll collection  wrt large  and made  obligatory  on vehicle  owners  within  a jurisdiction. Even
though  the cost  of the  electronic  equipment  for  standard  AVI  basea  on a one-way  communication
link is not considered  trivial,  the benefits  are a multiple  of the cost. As the sensitivity  analysis
performed  on the Hong Kong ERP Scheme  clearly  demontates, even after excluding  time- 61 -
savings  on philosophical  or other  grounds,  the savings  in opating  cost  stil yield  benefit  figures
that are considerably  greater  than the system  cost.  Using  yet anotber  yardstick,  the cost per
tansaction  is also  found  to be low."  The much  touted  invasion-of-privacy  issue that plagued
the Hong Kong  ERP scheme  in the past  can now be dealt with  by providing  road users access
to confidential  'numbered  account  arangements' with prepaid  cash deposit. The capital  cost
of electronic  road pricing  with smart card technology  for the Comprehensive  Road Pricmg
Scheme  of the Netherlands  is higher  than AVI alone  technology,  but the benefits  outweigh  the
cost  also. Put together,  the benefit-cost  ratio  remains  respectable.  Still, the  cost  per tanscon
of smart card technology  - based on a two-way communication  link - is about twice  that of
AVI alone technology,  and, even though  the cost per transaction  can still be regarded as
acceptable,  this technology  is still not widely  used  or. a commercial  basis. Neverthel,  rapid
progress  in microeectoics,  cryptology  and microwave  technologes  will continue  to yield
large-scale  economies  in the manufacuring  of AVI equipment,  read-write  transponders,  smart
cards  and the hardware  and software  that go with them. It may  very well be the case that the
cost  per transaction  of smart  card-type  AVI technology  will soon  approach  that of AVI alone
technology.
79.  What  emerges  from a quick  perusal  of Table  S is that elctronic approaches  of direct
road  use charging  are superior  to manual  approaches,  on average,  whether  from  the perspective
of a road user,  road authority  or society. Among  these  broad  categories,  ERP  using  AVI  alone
technology  is rankld  higher  than  ERP  usig  smart  card  - given  the state  of current  technologies
in 1992  - based  on an unweighted  index  of all the criteria  (see  Table  5).  In general,  ALS  is
superior  to cordon  pricing  using  manual  tollbooths.  Hence,  if budgetary  conditions  allow  it, the
feasibility  of implementing  ERP  ought  to be invated.  However,  if budget  is tight, then  AIS
(with  its low cost  and cresndinlWy  high  benefit-ost  ratio)  ought  to be seriously  considered.
If one is given only a  single criterion  to pick (out of  te  20 criteria), I argue that the most
important  measure  (although  not an all-inclusive  one) is the passage  of the benefit-cost  test.
A  Note  tat this  is so  despiteth  ct hat h  stadard capital  zcovy  ficta ud  to copwidldy  differipg
teholos  is biased agais  Cald-inZMAiv  AVI technogy  po_eumig big  fe.- 62 -
Nevertheless,  by pursuing  the multicriteria  analysis  introduced  here, the road authority  or
decision maker could - on the basis of other criteria listed - choose from amongst a variety of
congestion  charging  instruments.
Recommendations  of Congestion  Charging  Mechanisms  for Developing  Countries
80.  While  the principles  of road  use  charging  enunciated  here are applicable  worldwide,  the
following  guidelines  are put forth with  developing  countries  in mind:
0  On  the basis  of benefit-cost  calculations,  the  labor-intensive  technology  of supplementary
licensing  outranks  the  capital-intensive  technology  of electronic  road  pricing  via AVI  and
is especially  suitable  for those  developing  countries  that  have  a pool  of unemployed  work
force and limited gateways.  (A fairly reliable guide to the appropriateness  of
implementing  ALS in a particular  city is the citizenry's  adherence  to general traffic
regulations.)  This charging  instrument  is definitely  worth  revisiting,  with  the proviso
that improved  alternatives  such  as public  transport  and bypass  routes  be offered  (as in
the Singapore  ALS).
3  Cordon  pricing  via standard  manual  tollbooths  and unattended  reserved  lanes (as in
Bergen)  - supplemented  by periodic videographs  - may yet prove to be a worthwhile,
labor-intensive  technology  to consider  in developing  countries.
*  The lesson of  using electronic toll collection  as  in the Oslo Toll Ring amply
demonstrates  that  it is the peak/off-peak  pdcing  strategy,  rather  than  the electronics  per
se, that is benefit  enhancing  (as opposed  to being merely  revenue  enhancing).
*  Electronic  road pricing  via AVI alone  technology  is a viable  alternative  for the newly
industrializing  economy  whose  standard  of living  is rising  but whose  rapid  urbanization
and motorization  growth  rates are a major  problem.- 63 -
*  Smart  card  technology  is not widely  available  on a commercial  basis  in roads  and hence
is not  yet recommended  for  developing  countries  at this time,  even  though  Singapore  has
already  actively  sought  international  tenders  (as  a source  of technology  transfer)  for the
implementation  of  its Electronic  Road Pricing system with smart card by  1995.
Technological  breakthroughs  will  contnue  to make  this  electronic  equipment  worthwhile
on both  economic  and financial  grounds. In the  interim,  the use of two-way  microwave
read-wnte transponders  that are less costly and yet fully protect privacy can be
considered.
*  The disposition  of the revenues  collected  from road pricing  is crucial  to its success  -
be the funds  raised  by electronic  means  or not  - and should  be explicitly  laid out to the
public. Based  on both experience  and conceptual  grounds,  it appears  that earmarlkng
of the proceeds  from  road  pricing  would  serve  as an important  prerequisite  to the actual
implementation  of (Bank-mandated)  marginal  cost  pricing  in the road sector.
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Table 2:  Criteria  for a 'Good' Road Prcinog  System
FEom  WJsers'  Point of View (14):
1.  User-friendiness  (Slmplicity)
2.  Transparency  (via  &  Ante Pricing)
3.  Anonymity  (Protection  from Invasion  of Privacy)
4.  Prepayment/Postpayment  Option  for Charging
From Road Authority's  Point of View  (5-1  1:
5.  Enhanced  Efficiency  via Direct Charging
6.  Flexibility  (Responsiveness  to Demand)
7.  Reliability
8.  Security  and Enforcement:
a.  Protection  from Theft
b.  Protection  from Fraud
9.  Provision  for Occasional  Visitors
10.  'Market' Price as an Investment  Signal
11. Passage  of Revenue-Cost  Test
From Society's  POint  of View (12-20):
12. Passage  of Benefit-Cost  Test
13. Minimum  of Road  Work and Environml  Intrusion
14. Provision  for Mixed  Traffic
15. Handling  of Transitional  Phase
16. Compatibility  with  Other Systems
17. Modularity  to Add-on  Options  (e.g. automatic  rout  guidace)
18. Tolerance  to Culture  of Non-compliance
19. Tolerance  to Varied  Geography
20. Fairness  and the Availability  of Alteatives.- 67 -
Table 3:  Benefts,  Costs and Revenues of Various Cordon Toll Schemes
In Oslo, by Time Period, per year (in milions  of 1990 Norwegan  kroner)
1) Results  of the Present (Non-optimal)  Cordon Toil Scheme  In Osb  .e.,  a 24-hour
Inbound Flat  Toil of NOJ1O  [US$1.60D  vis-a-vis  the Base Case of No Toi
Savings  in  Savings  in Travel  Welfare  Loss  of  Total  Beneft
Operating  Cost  Time  Surplus
Peak  Periods  2.4  42.1  -6.3  38.3
Interpeak  Period  0.2  5.0  -7.0  -1.7
Off-peak  Period  0.4m  -0"""
All Periods  3.0  52.4  -33.6  219
Annual  Toil  Revenues,  R  600.0
Annual  Benefits,  B  21.9
Stops  at Manually-operated  Toilgates  4.9
Annaized Cost  of Toll  Collection,  C  96.6
Benefits  less  System  Cost,  NB  -79.6
Benefit-Cost  Ratio, BWC  0.2
Revenue-Cost  Ratio, R/C  6.2
2) Results  of an Improved  ('Optimal') Cordon  Toi Scheme  .e., an Inbound Peak Toi of
NOINS
[US$4])  vis-a-vis  the Base Case of No Toi
Savings  in  Savis  in Travel  Welfare  Los of  Total  Benefit
Operating  Cost  Time  Surplus
Peak  Periods  6.0  108.5  -19.4  95.2
Interpeak Period  0  o  0  0
Off  Pod  0  o  0  0
All  Periods  6.0  108.5  -19.4  95.2
Annual  Toll  Revenues,  R  180.0
Anmnal  Benefits,  B  95.2
Stops  at Manualy-operated  Tollgates  4.9
Anmualized  Cost  of Toil  Collection,  C  70.0
Benefits  less System  Cost, NB  20.3
Benefit-Cst Rato, W/C  13
Revenue-Cost  Ratio, RIC  2.6- 68 -
Table 3 (contnued)
3) Ru1_1 eof  a  fWet'  (nh*4ased  FuIy Eletronc  Read  Pt  Scme  , a
Marginal  Cost  ToU  appled IJUnk-by-Unk  vlo-yl  the Bm  Cme of No Toi
Sravngp  In  Savg  in Travel  Welfar Ls  of  Tota Benft
P°  Opting  Cost  Time  Surplus
Peak Periods  7.6  162.6  -19.3  150.9
Interpak Perl  0  0  0  0
Off-peak  Pid  0  0  0  0
All  Perod  7.6  162.6  -19.3  150.9
AnnualToll  Reveues, R  152.1
Anmnsl  Befits,  B  ,  150.9
A  alized  Cost  of ToU  Collecdon,  C  >70.0
Beanits loss  System  Cost,  AN  <80.9
Dedt-Cost  Raio, WIC  <2.2
Re3meC  bti  Rad,, I/C  <2.2
%gw: Ls  and  Ranoodi, 1990;  Ra  and  Larsen,  1991;  Lusen. MA=eu  and  Ranjd  1991;
RaAd,  199, with  correton;  and  disusions with  the athors.Table 4:  Bemft  Cost  aid  een,  of Car Ownerdhp rca  Ridatn  Miuue
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Theft  of a smart  card  is a problem,  aldthough  the  card  could  be made  invalid  when  oprat  in conjunction
with another  in-vehicle  unit.
Counterfeiting  of monthly  licenses  (or seasonal  pss)  is a potental  problem
32  Visitors  from  out of town  will  have  to incur  additional  time  in searching  for outlets  where  are licenses
or electronic  tags  could  be leased.
Even  though  Beqen Toll  Ring  has a 16-hour  charging  period,  a non-zero  toil  still  serves  as an investment
signal  reflecting  the  scarcity  value  of land  use.
14  Each  revemn-cost  ratio  reported  i  based  on the  respective  charging  policy  of the case  studies  examined.
Since  the  revenue-cost  ratios  are  high, i.e., low  cost  per doilar  of revenue  raised,  the  Norwegian  schem
- Bagen, Oslo  (and  Trdhaeim) Toil  Rngs  - are al toll-financing  schemes.
is  Despite  insufficient  data,  it is likely  that  the  net benefits  of cordon  pricing  would  not be high  sincoe  mnual
toll collection  by tollbooths  impedes  traffic  flow  and causes  congestion  itself.
is  Hoiland  and  Watson  (1978)  report  a tough  estimation  of the economic  rate of retum  for the first  year  of
the  Singapore  ALS  at 60%  to 150%.  Data  fiom  the  Hong  Kong  ERP  Project  indicates  that  the  benefit-cost
ratios  for  ALS  in Hong  Kong,  if implemented,  wouldbe  in the  rango  of 22.5:1  to 33.8:1,  even  higher  than
those  of the  Hong  Kong  ERP itself. All benefit-cost  ratios  are  based  on the  specific  case  studies  reported
in th  text.
7  nTh  lower  bound  estimate  of the benefit-cost  ratio is based  on the actual  Oslo  Toll Ring, whers  the
correspon  upper  bound  estimate  is for a 'perfict' (link-based)  road  pricing  scheme.
Is  noe  soci benefit-cost  ratio  for the Dutch  EW Proposal  using  smart  card technology  is 3.2.
to  Despite  the fact  that the capital  cost for smart  card technology  is high, the multiple  transactions  yield  a
level of cost  per tansaction  that is in tho mid  rage.  The annalzed capital  cost of a project  is arrived
at by using  a capital  recovery  factor  of 0.125,  coreponding to the interest  rate of 8% and a project  life
of 12 yeas.
MmTh  Hong  Kong  ERP  Scheme  required  some  amont of road  work,  whes  current  AVI  technologies  we
gantry-mounted  antennas  or in-pavement  antennas  requiring  minimal  road wodL
Current  AVI tecbnology  allows  a simple  version  of vehiclo  classfication  by linkig an AVI  trnsponder
with a vehicle's  class. Classicatin equipment  for heavy  vehicles  is available  and further  advances  in
atomatc vehicle  classification  (AVC)  are  curmnly  being  made.
Implementdatin  of road pricing  with manually-operated  toil plans is not expaen.  Implementation  of
eleconic road  pricing  with  existn electrmnic  toll  collection  facilities  is feasible,  especilly  with  a modular
desig.
Seasonal  passe and area licenses  may  not be compatible  with other  cities  nearby.
CurCurmly,  there  is a move  to come  up with an intraionaly  agreed  upon  standard  for AVI technology,
as part  of tho  DRIVE  project  in Europe  and the  HELP  project  in the  United  States,  plus  its integrtion  with
automaic  vehicle  classificaon  and weigh-in  motion  equipment- 75  -
2s  It is expected  that noncompliance  will take place at the unatded  nonstop  reserved lames  becuw  video
enformnent is carried out only on a periodic  basis to minimi  cost.
26  Enforcement  of moving  vehicles  under the Singapore  ALS  is camed out at normal traffic speeds. On the
other hand, enforcemnt of vehicles  at freway speeds is likely to be infeasible. A good rle  of thumb to
use to ascertain  whether  a countay  is ready to implement  ALS is the degree of its citizes'  compliance  with
parking regulations.
27  Naturl  cordon  boundaries  and limited  access to the city are both  prerequisites  to cordon  prcing and ALS.
2  lThe  criterion of 'faimess  and the avilaaility of altenatives' is clearly case-specific  and does not apply to
the charging  instruments  in and of itself.
29  The Bergen  and Oslo Toil Rings  both succeeded  pnncipally becuse  the toll rvenues were earmarked for
road coumnsction  (80%) and busways  (20%).
30  Without  the provision  of public  tranpot  and bypass  routes, the Siga  ALS  might  not have succeoded.
31  Although  Hong Kong has exceptionally  good public tansport  altmatives,  ERP floundered  becauso the
public  perceived thst ERP was 'just another  tax', despite  Goverment's  promise that it is rvenue-nutral,
and thwir  privacy might  be compromised  in the light of 1997.
32  The  Netheilands'  Comprehensive  Road Pricing  Scheme  failed  because  the car lobby felt  that it wa  anotor
revenue-raisingistrument and that  it would  place n unifair  burden  on those  suburban  residents  who located
where they  had as a result of past govenment policy.
33  The iankng is based on an unweighted  sum of the 20 criteria applied to the ilustrative case studies  at
hand.  Criteria 11, 12 and 20, in particular, pertain  more to the case studies  than the charging  instrument
method  per se.- 77 -
Annex  1:  The Spapore  Area liens  Scheme,  1975  to present
A.  Background  Informaton
81.  The Singapore  Area Licening Scheme  (ALS)  which  began  in June 1975,  is the world's
foremost  example  of road  pricing. During  the  morning  peak  period  of 7:30  to 9:30  a.m. (except
Sundays  and holidays),  automobile  drivers  desiring  to euLe the Restricted  Zone  - an area of
over 5 kilometers  square  - within  the Central  Busines District  of Singapore  were required  to
purchase  a daily or monthly  license  from the kiosks  or post offices  just outside  the Restrcted
Zone.9 Iniially, taxis, buses, carpools  (of more than four psengers)  and commercial
vehicles  were exempt  from the entry fee. The specally-shaped  and color-coded  licenses  were
Priced  by tral and error at around  SS3  [US$1.251  each, with  the day or month  printed  in large
characters  and displayed  near the top left hand  corner  of the windshield.  The visibility  of the
dated  color  stickers  allowed  traffic  wardens  to check  them  as velicles  drove  by any  of the gantry
posts signaling  the entrance  to the zone  at the city speed  limit of 50 kph.  It is the nonstop
feature  of the ALS - as distinct from manualy opeated toll booths  which  also attempt  to
implementcordon  pcing  - that  is unique  and  reaps ignficant savings  in travel ime. The  ALS
is part of a comprehensive  package  of taffic restraint  measures  by the Singaport  Government.
Several  months  prior to the opening  of the ALS on June 2,  1975,  authorities  instituted  the
following  complementary  traffic  management  measues  in order  to achieve  the goal of 25% to
30%  reduction  in traffic  volume:  a) monthly  parking  charges  in both  public  ani private  parldng
lots were  about  doubled  (via  mandated  prce increases  and surcharges)  and un;iorm  hourly  rates
were  replaced  by rates  which  varied  by geographical  location  and duration  of say; b) 15  park-
and-ride  facilities  (oviding  about  10,000  new  parldng  spae)  were  constucted  just outside  the
Restricted  Zone to ease the swintch  from private  to public tansport; c) premium  franchised
shutde  bus services  were  provided  to facilitate  the transfer  from the fringe  parldng  lots to the
downtown  area; and d) flexime was encouraged  by the government  as part of a wider  public
e Resticted  Zom has  now  beWm  i  (by lad r  tamdo1)  to 725  hctu  (or 7.25 squarm
lilometer).  Ieo  mondl  licyHw fee  is et at  twt  tbin. d  daiy Hoen fee.- 78 -
information  campaign. After 1975,  there were a couple  of changes  in fees, boundaries  and
operating  hours (see  Ang, 1989,  Table  2).  PrincipaUy,  the exemption  of txis  from AIS  fees
were rescinded  (August  1, 1975)  and company  cars were required  to pay twice the rate of
private  cars (January  1, 1976).
82.  Beginning  June 1, 1989, there was a new and major revision  of the ALS:  a) the
restricted  times  of operation  were extended  to cover both the morning  and afternoon  peak
periods,  with the latter  occurring  at 4:30-7:00  p.m. (but  later changed  to 4:30-6:30  p.m.);  b)
aU  vehicles  were  charged,  with  the  exception  of emergency  vehicles  (such  as ambulances,  police
cars and fire engines)  and public  buses,  so that carpools  were no longer  exempt;  c) the daily
license  fee for automobiles  was lowered  from S$5 per day to S$3 per peak period  entry - a
(more  than)  40%  decrease  in real charges!;  and  d) motorcycles  were  to pay one Singapore  dollar
per day (after  July 1, 1989).
B.  Anlysis of Results  (1975-89)
83.  Even though  the ALS was touted to be a resounding  success,  it was not free from
qualifications.  First, as expected  from intuition,  during  the morning  peak  period, the number
of motor  cars dropped  by three fourths  within  the first month  whereas  all vehicles  dropped  by
between  a third and a half during  that period, easily surpassing  the government's  objectives
(Toh, 1977,  Table 1; Watson  and Holland,  1978,  Chapter  4).  Second,  however,  as intuition
would  also  expect, motorists  rescheduled  their trips to arrive during  those  periods  just befnre
and immediately  after  the restricted  period,  prompting  authorities  to extend  the time  period  the
ALS  was in operation  by three quarters  of an hour to 10:15  a.m. on June 23, 1975. Third,
simultaneously  there  was a significant  increase  in the number  of taxis  of about  a quarter  within
the first three weeks,  prompting  authorities  to remove  taxis fom the exempt  list on August  1,
1975."°  More  importantly,  a full year after ALS  came  into effect,  there remained  a decrease
in private  cars of three-fourths  and a decrease  in all vehicles  of one-half,  despite  the fact that
As a compromise,  auhori  lowwted  Xt fee  for  tis  fiam  S$4  to S$2  on  Aril  1, 1977.- 79 -
there  was an increase  in the ALS  fee of one Singapore  dollar  on January  1, 1976  (Seah,  1980,
Table 1). Fourth,  one month  before  ALS  began,  new  non-uniform  parldng  charges  (rising  by
length-of-stay  and by proximity  to the CBD)  - designed  as a complementary  measure  to area
licensing  - served  to raise  the out-of-pocket  costs  of motorists  (Watson  and Holland,  1978,  pp.
24-27,  68-73). Monthly  parking  fees  of government  car parks  were also  raised  (by  at least  20-
40%) and operators  of private  parking  lots were required  to match the price increases. In
addition,  the government  levied  a surcharge  equvalent  to the pnce increase. By discouraging
circular  traffic within  the zone in this way, public transport  was made  more attractive  and
substitutable. Fifth, the fringe parking  lots to promote  the park-and-ride  mode - another
complementary  measure  to road pricing  - were deemed  unsuccessful  almost  from inception,
with  only 4% of the parking  spaces  taken  up in the first year and a half (Watson  and Holland,
1978,  Table  3.3).  Hence  the authorities  promptly  responded  by converting  the empty  parldng
lots into hawkers'  markets  and cooked  food  stores. Sixth, the quality  shuttle  bus service  was
also  a failure,  with  ridership  well below  the capacity  of the buses,  and so the  privately  operated
shuttle  buses  were quickly  merged  with  the regular  bus system  (Watson  and Holland,  1978,  p.
36; Wilson, 1988). Seventh,  the enforcement  of offenders  was  carried  out by assigning  entry
po"nt  attendants  (between  1 and 5) to issue  traffic  tickets  via mail. Perhaps  because  of the stiff
penalty  of S$50  for an offender,  which  is  just short  of the cost  of a monthly  license  fee of S$60,
the rate of violation  was  only 1  %-2%  in 1975  (Watson  and Holland,  1978,  Table  3.1). Eighth,
motorcycle  travel  - presumably  a crude substitute  for private car use - increased so much that
charges  for motorcycles  were introduced. Ninth,  as a result of a doubling  of the number  of
carpools  within  the first  year and  annual  growth  occurring  thereafter  durng the operating  hours
of the ALS  (Seah, 1988,  Table 1), and because  nine-tenths  of carpoolers  did not make  reurn
trips in the same fashion,  carpools  were no longer  exempt  as of June 1, 1989.  Tenth, the
,mirror image effect  hoped for in the afternoon  peak period  did not materialize  because  of
cross-town  traffic in the afternoon. One third of the total trans-Restricted  Zone commuting
traffic  chose  to travel  on the ring  road, which  serves  as a bypass  route;  two-thirds  still  chose  to
go through  the Restricted  Zone  after  ALS  was  introduced.  (Only  one-seventh  of the (two-thirds)
through  traffic  chose  to drive  into  the Restricted  Zone  during  the restncted  hours;  the rest of the
through  traffic  switched  to a different  time  or made  a detour  by traveling  on the circuitous  route-80 -
in the morning  peak  or changed  modes  (Watson  and Holland,  1978,  p. 7)). In due course,  the
detours  resulted  in heavy  traffic  along  the nag road around  the Restricted  Zone,  tating
traffic  management  measures  such  as the re-timing  of traffic  lights. On the other  hand, on the
return  trips, traffic  traverses  directly  through  the relatively  uncongesd downtown  area in the
afternoon  peak. Further,  only about  one tenth of the carpool  were esdmated  to make  their
return  trips  in the same  fashion  (others  used  public  transport,  taxis,  or were collected  in private
vehicles). As a result,  "bumper  to bumper  congesdon'  was  observed  during  the aftnoon  peak
in 1983,  with  average  traffic  speed  being  18 kph,  in contrast  to 30 kph during  the morning  peak
(Behbehani,  Pendakur,  Armstrong-Wright,  1984,  p. 36). Thus the moming  ALS scheme  was
able  to solve  only  part of the congestion  problem.
C.  Analvsis  of Results  (1989-present)
84.  The 'mirror image' phenomenon  therefore  contrbuted  dirctdy to the extension  of the
reincted hours of the ALS  on June 1, 1989  (from  the moming  peak into the aftenoon peak
period,  initially  beginning  from  4:30 -7 p.m. but later  curilled  to 6:30 p.m. to accommodate
business  interests  and activities). 6'
85.  The  most  comprehensive  survey  to date  regarding  the impact  of the AIS was  carried  out
in Febuary,  1990  by the Public  Works  Department  and the Nanyang  Technological  Institute
(Menon  and Seddon,  1991)  and the results  are briefly  analyzed  here.  One, the traffic  survey
indicates  that there  was  a marked  increase  in total  in-bound  taffic immediately  before  and after
the afternoon  peak period came into operation,  similar to the historical  pattern during the
morning  peal. Further,  compansons  of traffic  levels  traveiog  in and out of the Restricted  Zone
were made  between  May 1989  (which  represents  the pro-June  1989  scheme)  and May 1990
(which  represents  the post-June  1989  scheme).  Two, as expected,  the comparisons  indicate  that
"  m Sinsae  ALS  did  not  try out  't-id flow'  erpimun chur,  in which  urs-  impoed  an
homard  bound  trips  out  of the  ceul  bins  district  to tho  sobulbs  in  n with  t  min uffic  flow,
a  opposed  to the  cuirant  pvacvic  of chargmg  for  entry  perse both  ino  nmog  and  the  afdl_emn.  Thb
'tidal  flow'  idea  is he basi of Long  Kong's  Bleoctmic  Road  Picing  Systm  Scheme  B.- 81  -
the total vehicle  flow had decreased  - suggesting  that cross-town  through  traffic had been
curtailed  - concomitant  with an increase  in traffic  on the rig  roads. Three, both the drastic
cut in daily  license  fee for cars and taxis  plus the introduction  of charging  of carpools  resulted
in a net increase  in inbound  automobile  tffic  during  the morning  peak  of thre-tenths, relative
to May 1989  (in which  a high  daily  license  fee of S$5  previously  applied). Four, a significant
reduction  in inbound  automobile  traffic  of seven-tenths  naturally  occurs  during  the afternoon
peak  - relative  to May, 1989  (when  no charges  were  applied  at all in the afternoon  peak). Five,
by contrast, since goods vehicles  (and motorcycles)  are now charged when entering the
Restricted  Zone, there has been a sgnificant  reduction  in these vehicles  of six tenths, during
both the moming  and afternoon  peak periods,  as intuition  would  lead us to expect. Six, as a
result  of introducing  the  evening  ALS,  average  traffic  speed  within  the Restricted  Zone  increased
to 30 kph in 1990,  as indicated  in the Report  of the Select  Committee  on Land  Transportation
Policy  (see  Seventh  Parliament  of Singapore,  1990;  Olszewski  and Tan, 1991). Seven,  despite
a growing  economy,  the recent lowenng  of the daily license  fee - possibly  the outcome  of a
trial-and-eror  pricing  process  - suggests  that  the Singapore  Government  is currently  using  ALS
as a traffic management  tool to curtail  congestion  rather  than as a revenue-generating  device.
D.  Financial  and Economic  Evaluation
86.  Even  though  the purpose  of the ALS  is not to raise  revenue,  it fulfills  the government's
multipronged  objective  of seeking  a traffic  restraint  measure  that  does  not involve  subsidization
Croh,  1977). From a purely  financial  point  of view,  this policy  measure  is appealing  to local
authorities,  especially  in an age of declining  municipal  funds.
87.  The capital  cost  of the ALS  is SS6.6  million  [US$2.8  million]  in 1975  and the recurrent
cost for the period 1975-89  is S$l.0 million  tUS$0.4  million),  including  about 40 entry point
atendants opating  22 gantries  for enforcement  purposes,  in 1975.62  The monthly  revenue
Nobt  that  the  US dollar  equivalent  here  is eprssed  in 1975  dolla,  using  di  exch  an  t  of S$2.40 -
US$1. T1euays  that  immed8iy  follows  i  based  an fir  from  Waton and Hlland's (1978)  sudy
for tie first  year  only, nd the  rest is computed  from  the  d  tho author  cocd  firm Sao's  Public-82 -
from the sale of ALS licenses averages S$472,000 in  1975 for the last four months.  After
netting out the operating costs of  ticket sales, car parks and enforcement, the monthly net
revenue was about S$420,000, resulting  in a net financial  return to the authorities  of about 76%
(Watson and Holland, 1978, pp. 38-39).  As a result of a one dollar increase in daily license
fees on January 1, 1976, the gross revenue increased to a monthly figure of S$568,000, which,
together with comparable operating costs of S$52,000, yield a net financial rate of return of
94  %.  Note that the capital  cost of $6.6 million  is less than  that of building an urban expressway
two kilometers long (Watson  and Holland, 1978, p. 37)!
88.  Since the construction of car parks, bus shelters, provision of utilities and landscaping
account for over nine tenths of the capital  cost of the ALS, and since the park-and-ride  facilities
were considered a failure and converted to more productive uses, the capital cost of the ALS
itself - which is nothing more than overhead gantry structures, electric signs, and 15 or so
booths for the sales of licenses - is only S$316,000 (Watson and Holland, 1978, Table 3.6).
This means that the net financial  rate of return is 1,590%, or an equivalent revenue-cost  ratio
of 16.9 (see also Wilson, 1988). These figures can be compared with the net financial  rate of
return figure calculated on the basis of data the author compiled for 1975-89. There the net
financial  rate of return, based on annualized  capital  and operating  cost and annwal  revenue-cost
ratios, comes to 590% with the revenues and costs of opafting  the car parks and 1,080%
without the associated  revenues and costs of the car parks.  The difference  between the 'short-
term' figures collected within the first year and a half and dhe  'long-term' figures collected over
a 14-year  period can perhaps  be partally explained  by: a) the amortzation of capital  costs over
a longer time period, b) the reduction  in opeating cost of the ALS through learning by doing,
and c) thL,  'long-term' figures include  enforcement  costs hitherto  not taken into account.  Based
on an average daily car traffic volume of 45,000 in 1989  during the morning peak period and
the number of operating days of the ALS of 301 (including  Saturdays)  in a year, the cost per
transaction  comes to S12.1 cents for the period 1975-89  [US9.9 cents in 1990 figures] with car
parks and S6.8 cents for the period 1975-89 [US5.6  cents in  1990 figure] without car parks.
Works  Dqatment snd Regisky of Vehicles  for the peiod  1975-89.- 83 -
Based  on an average  daily car traffic volume  of 45,000  during the morning  peak period  and
24,000  during  the afternoon  peak  and the number  of operating  days of 283 in a year, the cost
per transaction  comes  to S16.5 cents for the fiscal  year 1989 [US9.4  cents in 1990 figures]
wwhout  car parks.6 3 By employing  the index  of cost  per transaction  alone, the Singapore  Area
Licensing  Scheme  is among  the least  costly  of alternative  methods  of charging  for road use.
89.  In a review  of the impact  of the ALS  after  nine  years  of operation,  a team  of World  Bank
researchers  observed  that had the ALS package  of traffic management  measures  not been
implemented,  there would have been bumper-to-bumper  traffic conditions  universally  in the
Restricted  Zone  by 1982  (Behbehani,  Pendakur  and Armstrong-Wright,  1984,  p. 50). Further,
the deferred  or canceled  investments  for  roads  amount  to savings  to society  of the order  of  S$1.5
billion.
90.  The paucity  of benefit-cost  studies  on the Singapore  ALS means  that it is difficult  to
come  up with strong  conclusions  as to its economic  viability. Holland  and Watson  bnefly
reported  an economic  evaluation  in their 1978  article. A lower  bound  estimate  of an economic
rate of return  of 15%  is obtained  for the first year. This  figure  seems  to be on the low side  for
such a major undertaking. Nevertheless,  it includes  only time savings  and not savings  in
operating  costs  and fuel which  are normally  calculated  in transport  projects. (urther,  it does
not employ  the standard  assumption  of value  of tme being a funcdon  of the wage  rate, but
assumes  that everyone  has the same  value  of time.) Since  at least  three  fourths  (or nine  tenths)
of the capital  cost  of the scheme,  which  went into the construction  of fringe  car parks, could
have  been saved,  the economic  rate of return  would  have  become  60% (or 150%)  in the first
year. The estimxate  here does  not take  into account: a) the costs  to commuters  of rescheduling
or the losw  in welfare  for 'hlose  tolled  off the desired  mode,  and b) the gain in welfare  to the
ones who valued  time highly  and were tolled at the (lower)  average  rate upon enterng the
Restricted  Zone.
T0  Me difference  in the number  of days  a year  aises becaus  the  post-June  1989  schm  operated  an a five
and a half  day  a week  bis.  bat is, (5 + 45000169000)  x 52  - 11 holidays  = 283  days.- 84 -
91.  In a rigorous  welfare  analysis,  Wilson  (1988)  uses a joint mode  choice  and work start
time choice  model  to analyze  the same  set of individuals  surveyed  in a pre- and post-ALS  set
of data  by the World  Bank. His  results  indicate  that: a) some  travelers  are worse  off  as a result
of being  tolled  off  when  entering  the Restricted  Zone  during  its operating  hours  and are diverted
onto a different  time period  or even onto public tsanport, and having to incur the resultant
rescheduling  costs  which  exceed  the  payment  of the ALS  fee  itself;  b) some  motorists  (who  used
to travel,  say,  just outside  the restricted  hours)  had to suffer  increased  congestion  as a result  of
those  motorists  who  were tolled  off the restricted  times,  and those  public  transport  commuters
who had to face  a more  congested  public  tranwsport  environment  following  AMS  would  also  be
worse  off; and c) those  commuters  who chose  to remain  as is and be tolled  would  be worse  off
unless  their values  of time savings  are sufficiently  high."  He concludes  that a constant,  flat-
rate toll may  in fact  result in a decrease  in social  welfare  as in Nash-Bentham-Sen,  contrary  to
the -exuberantu  feeling  surrounding  the  positive  results  of the AIS scheme  in 1975-78.  Wlon
simulates  the effects  of making  various  revenue-neutal  assumptions  by explicitly  retuning the
toll revenues  to the individuals  in the sampled  popUiation  and comparing  the pre- and  post-AMS
results. However,  he acknowledges  that he has not taken  into account  incentive  effects. The
setting  of the AMS  fee in 1975-76  may  have  been  widely  observed  to be on the high side  and it
resulted  in the underutilization  of the road  network  in the Restrcted Zone. Subsequently,  the
ALS fee was lowered,  on June 1, 1989. However,  it is unclear  how the simulation  results
would  have  panned  out given  a real decre  in daily licenses  exceeding  40%.
E.  Lessons  for ImDlementng  Area Licensing
92.  A few  lesons emerge  from  analyzing  the  Singapore  ALS  for  the purpose  of chargng for
congeson:  a) ALS,  being  fairly  low cost  and requiring  one gantry  per entry  point, would  be
suitable  for cities  with limited  access;6 b) ALS  defers  hefty investment  in roads  and requires
"  Botb  intuind  twy  sggest  tht these  bt  are to be  ctd  (u a  1992).
*  For a tpicl  United  Sats  inner-city  si  of two  sque  mles and  ming 12  major  shteets  to a mile,  dio
toa numberof  prcigpointsorgies  ndod woudw  be96  (or48  if half  ao  e-way  dreeb). fdeed
econoica;lly  efficient,  a few  mmor  roads  locdad  a tb ecdon bonday could  be dod  off  (as  was  don-85 -
very little  land for its impLemenlation,  epcept  the dozen  or so kiosks  fo  ales of lienses;  c)
enforcement  may  be difficult  for high speed  expressways  but the level  of skills  required  is not
high, so it is suitable  for a low-tech,  labor-intsve  society; d) ALS  work best as part of a
package  of complementary  traffic management  measus  such as parking pricing and the
provision  of  viable alternatives  for travelers (in the form of  improved  public tsport,
alenative modes  and routes); e) since  ALS  is not capital  intensive,  it is particularly  amenable
to a short-term  experiment,  leaving  few  long-term  rpercussions;  and f) ALS  has worlkd  well
and should  adapt  itself, with any necessary  modicons,  to a culture  that has a tradition  of
compliance  and law enforcement.
in Sinqo)  to lvy on cWpibl d opsrati  coda  of putis.  Furthr, note  dht ALS  acmoda
aocuazl visitr  and  dows  noa  rqi  the  w&forat  of  l;m  onveicls  have  h  ted  the  Reuincted
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Annex  2:  The Manually-Operated  Bergen  Toll  Ring, 1986  to present
A.  Background  Informadion"
93.  The Bergen Toll Ring began on January 2,  1986 within a couple of years after the
scheme was first proposed.  Following Singapore,  it is the second city to charge motorists  for
entering  the Central Business  Distict (CBD). The scheme  involved  the construction  of tollgates
at six entry points to the CBD of Bergen, Norway's second largest city.6 7 The tollgates are
aU manualy operated, with about half of the lanes for motorists paying by cash or prepaid
tickets and the other half reserved for motorists  with seasonal  passes (i.e., seson  tickets)  placed
behind  the windscreen. These passes could be purchased  on a monthly, six-monthly,  and yearly
basis, their purpose being to allow traffic to go through the toUlgates  at expreway  speed. The
enforcement of offer.ders is caried  out by occasional  videotape recording of license plates in
these unattended  lanes.  Since its inception, the toll rates have remained  at NOKS [US80 cents
in 1990 figures] for light vehicles such as automobiles,  with buses and light motorcycles  being
exempt.  (Heavy vehicles  are charged exactly twice the rate of light vehicles and the rate for
monthly  seasonal  pass holders are set at 20 times the daily rate (SWderstr6m,  1988).) The hours
of operation for entry have been set at Monday through  Friday, 6 a.m. - 10 p.m. (except  public
holidays)  - not quite daylight pricing.  Note that the purpose of settng the toll at a low level
is to increase  revenues  earmarked for road financing. (For purposes of charging for congestton,
the toll rate should be higher to have a positive impact and should apply for a more selective
time period.  With its net toll revenue (totalling  25% of funds for a road program), Bergen  was
able to obtain a  matching grant (25%), and when these grants are  combined with regular
"5  This  nx  is based piincipally  on Lasn  (1987, 1988). Extensive  discussions  with him and insights
borrowed  are gratfiuly acknowledged.
67  Four  of the  toilgates  hve two  lanes  - one for motos  payg  cash  and  pepaid (coupon  book)  tices  and
another  for use  of seasonal  passes  - and two  of dte  paalld tollge  have  four lanes  - two for cash  and
prepaud  tckets and the other  two for seasonal  passes. Thus,  the tota mumber  of les  in the 6 toll  p1 as
is 16.- 87-
government  funds (50%),  Bergen  was able  to pursue  a road construction  program  within  half
the time horizon  previously  envisaged  for its road construction  program. Citing  problems  of
congestion,  air and noise  pollution  and traffic  safety,  eight  tenths  of toUl  revenues  are earmarked
for road construction  and improvement  and two tenths  for bus lanes, etc. (to improve  pubLic
transport).
B.  Analysis  of Results
94.  Even  though  the principal  purpose  of the toll ring was not traffic  restraint,  traffic was
projected  to fall by 3%.  Given  that the overall  traffic growth  of 10% was due to ecozemic
growth, it was stiU  found that the isolated (i.e., ceterisparibus) impact  of the toll ring was that
traffic  declined  by 6%-7%  in the first  year. In surveys  conducted  by the Institute  of Transport
Economics,  Norwegian  Centre  for Transport  Research  (arsen,  1987,  1988),  the effects  of the
toll ring were found  to be as follows: a) change  in route choice  was negligible  since the
topography  allows  almost  no detours;  b) there  was an internal  adjustmr-  t for households  which
are seasonal  pass holders  and have  more than one car, resulting  in more car trips undertaken
since  the additional  toll is zero; c) it is unclear  whether  a change  in mode  choice  from car to
public  transport  had taken  place;  d) through  trfic  declined  by 6-7%; e) car occupancy  seems
to have  increased  slightly;  and f) changes  in trip  timing  are observed  at the  end of the charging
period  but the effect  is not sgniicant.
95.  Even though  only a quarter  of all vehicle  owners  in Bergen  are hol&drs  of seasonal
passes,  slightly  over  half  (55%)  of the CBD-destined  trips  are undertaken  by these  holders  every
day.68 In particular,  seven  tenths  of trips during  the morning  rush hours are undertaken  by
these holders. It was found  that seasonal  pass holders  undertake  about 1.7 trips per day on
average,  implying  an effective  charge  of about NOI2.90 [US46  cents], (a 40% discount  or
more)  as compared  to the standard  toll rate of NOKS  [US8O  cents]. From a road authority's
Leus  th  amo tenth  of Bergui's populion live inside do  toil  ing (Sderut6m, 1988).- 88  -
persective, the multiple  use  of seasonal  pases may  dampen  the effectivenes  of cordon  pncing
as a congestion  charging  instrument.
C.  ,EawHatiml
96.  Tradeoffs will have  to be made  either to disallow  seasonal  users' implicit  rebates  and
charge  directly  for their  entry, via tollgates,  potentially  exacerbating  congestion  and increasing
operator  costs,  or to allow  the continuation  of seasonal  passes  with their (invaluable)  nonstop
nature  but their zero (marginal)  toll effect. Prima  facie, it appears  that the advantages  of the
use of seonal  passes  mitigates  the disadvantages  of charging  for congestion  via toligates. The
videotaping  of license  plates  was  done on a periodic  but random  basis, with the number  plates
checked  against  the list of seasonal  pass holders'  license  plates. A tolerable  level  of about  2%
violators  was found  based  on  a 5% random  check  of aU  vehicles  passing  through. A fairly  hefty
fine equivalent  to twice  the monthly  fee was  imposed  on offenders,  apparently  with  the desred
effect.  The enforcement  cost of monitoring  motorists  who cheat  and the follow-up  work  of
issuing  traffic  tibets are more  or less  covered  by the  revenues  derived  from such  pursuits. Thus
enforcement  costs  are all internalized  with this approach  to charging  for congestion.
97.  The capital  cost of the system  (including  the construction  of tollgates,  consultant  fees,
equipment  and the publicity  campaign)  is NOK12.8  million  in 1986  [US$2.58  million  in 1990],
and the  opering cost  (including  toll  operators'  salaries,  etc.)  amounts  to N0A7.2 million  a year
(US$1.45  million  in 1990]. The  gross  revenues  total  NOKS5  million  in 1986  [US$11.10  million
in 1990]. As  a toll  financing  nehanism, the collection  cost  per dollar  of net revenue  was 19%.
Since this partal dead-weight  loss was lower than the high social  opportumity  cost of public
funds  esdmated  to be in the 30%-40%  range  in Norway,  toll financing  is therefore  regarded  as
a viable  alternative  to tax financing  and  enhances  the  Toll  Ring's rauon  d'*mte.  With  an average
daily taffic  count of 62,000  for 260 days of option  in a year, the cost per transaction
(including  aU  enforcement  costs)  comes  to NORO.546  in 1986  [US1l.O  cents  in 1990]. When
compared  with  the Singapore  ALS,  the cost  per transon  is only  slightly  higher  but within  the- 89 -
compared  with  the Singapore  ALS,  the  cost  per transaion is only slightly  higher  but within  the
same order of magnitude. This is to be expectd since  half of aU  lanes were reserved  for
seasonal  pass holders  and were left unmaned.  If welfare  maximiaton is pursued  in lieu of
revenue  maximiaonper  se, then  it is desirable  to: a) iZuce the number  of opeating hours,
from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.  to perhaps daylight hours 6 a.m. to 5 p.m.  (as is curently  done in
Trondheim)  or to the morning  and  afternoon  peak  periods  only  (as  in the revised  Singapore  ALS
post-1989  period)  in order  to impact  the modal  split of tmly congestion-causing  traffic;  and b)
raise  entry  prices  higher to effectuate  a reduction  in rush hour taffic.  The side  effects  of this
twin policy would most lily  be an increase  in revenues, both because  of the relatively
unronsive  (i.e., inelastic)  natre  of peak  demands  as well as the savings  in toll opeors'
salaries. Alas, no benefit-cost  studies  have  been  performed  on the Bergen  Toil Ring  to cross-
check  my intuition.
D.  Lessons  for Implemendng  Cordon  Pricing  via Tollgtes and Reserved  Lanes
98.  Some  lessons  to be drawn  from the Bergen  Toll  Ring  of charging  for congestion  are as
follows: a) For cities  with  limited  entries  (and  detours)  in developing  countries  such  as Lagos,
Bombay  and Jakarta,  manual  charging  of congestion  via tollgates  is potentially  feasible. b) If
the fraction  of regular  commuters  is high, the use of reserved  lanes for holders  of seasonal
passes  can be justfied.  The use of reserved  lanes would  both reduce  the delays  that are the
major  drawback  of cordon  prcing via tollgates,  and  lower  the capital  and operating  costs  of the
toll facility  itself. c) Toll  collection  is a well-established  technology  for the constrction of toll
roads, tunnes and  bridges,  with  almost  universal  acceptance  in terms  of administatio.  d) The
use  of toll  revenues  to finance  road  constrction and/or  public  trasport seems  to appeal  to road
users  as being 'fair' and appears  to be a political  prerequisite  to implementation.Annex  3:  Ihe Electronic  and hMnual Zone  Fee Proposal of Stockholm,  1989 and 1992
A.  The Qllon  NW  Maa  Zone  Fee Poosals  of Stockholm.  1989
99.  In order to combat environmental  pollution  and congestion,  the City of Stockholm
proposed  that a wholly  electronic  fee system  be imposed  on automobiles  entering  Stockholm
(City  of Stockholm,  1989a). The  inner city is marked  by a circular  cordon  line around  it with
32 control  points. In addition,  a screen  line with 9 control  points bisects the cordon,  with
vehicles  crossing  it in any direction  being  charged. (Through  traffic  can still  pass through  the
city without  charge  via certain  by-pass  routes). Only one charge  is made  each  day regardless
of origin  or destination  - thus  the concept  of a day fee levied  from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday
through  Friday.  The proposed day fee of SE125 [US$4.22]  - which is much higher  than a
revenue-maximizing  fee in order  to combat  congestion  - is expected  to curtail  traffic  by a fifth.
In contrast  to other systems  such as the Trondheim  system,  in which transpondeii  for local
resdWents  are given  away  free, each  local motonst  desiring  to enter inner  Stockholm  is required
to purchase  a transponder  at manufacturer's  cost, estimated  to be SEK100  [US$16.89]  a piece.
About  nine  tenths  of motorists  are estimated  to be driving  with  purchased  transponders,  whereas
a tenth  of motonsts  are enforced  via the video  recording  system  and charged  by arrears  if they
are found  to be without  rental  transponders.  It was  hoped  that  technological  development  would
be able to verfy pictured  license  plate numbers  electronically  rather than manually. With
avrage  daily traffic of 195,000  cars and 260 opering  days a year, the system cost per
transaction  is SEKO.69  [US12.7  cents]  in 1990  figures,  which  is higher  than  that  of a simple  AVI
system  for toll  roads  but lower  than  that of a combination  AVI and manual  system.
100.  Because  the electronic  tee  system was estimated  to take a  couple of years from
implementation  to  oration, the City of Stockholm  proposed  a manual  zone  fee system,  i.e.,
supplementary  licesing, in June 1989  to serve  dunng  the transitional  period  (City  of Stockholm,
1989b). The splementary  license  was set  at the same  rate as that proposed  for the electronic
system,  that  is, SE25  [US$4.22]  a day. In addition,  a monthly  car card  of SE300 [US$50.68]- 91 -
is available. It was estimated  that at least 50 traffic wardens  were required  to monitor  the
nonstop  traffic and a degree  of compliance  of only 75% was expected  due to enforcement
problems. The cost  per transaction  of SEK1  .97 [US36.4  cents]  in 1990  figures  for the manual
proposal  is considerably  higher  than  that  of the electronic  proposal  a couple  of months  earlier.
101.  In Autumn  1990,  a bill was placed  before  the Swedish  Parliament  to introduce  road
pricing  in Stockholm  on an experimental  basis  from  January  1991  to June 1993. As a result  of
higher  petrol  prices  around  the  time  of the Gulf  war,  and reservations  about  the manual  zone  fee
proposal,  the road  pricing  experiment  was deferred  until  an acceptable  electronic  system  that
could  protect  privacy  becomes  available.
B.  The Demis Paka.  1221-92
102.  In January  1991,  the three political  parties  in the City and County  of Stockholm,  who
form  a two-thirds  majority  in Parliament,  signed  an agreement  on traffc and the environment
known  as the Dennis  agreement. 70 They  agreed  that major  investments  totalling  SEIQ8  billion
[US$4.73  billion]  will  need  to be spent  - half of them  are for public  tranport and  the other  half
are for ring roads  around  Stockholm.  What  they had left undecided  was the issue  of whether
or not to implement  road pricing  in Stockholm  in 1997  and, in the Gothenburg  area in 1994
(Ministry  of Transport  and Communications,  1991). The Swedish  Parliament  has adopted  the
pnnciple  of marginal  social  cost  pricing  - including  congestion,  environment,  road  maintenance
and accident  costs. For the Stockholm  region,  the marginal  social  costs  for car taffic alone  are
estmated  to be SEK 10.0  billion  [US$1.69  billion]  in 1990,  of which  SEK2.5  billion  [US$0.42
billion] - only a quarter -- is collected (regnr,  1991).  Fully three quarrs  of  the total
marginal  costs  are composed  of congestion  costs  (42%)  and accident  costs (35%). The annual
Th  nualized  capital  and  opatg  coda  nd revmu figur  ae ten  from  Abbott  (1990)  whs  the not
of th  data  is from  City  of Stockholm,  1989b.
°  ITh three myor  parties ae  the Socid Demoats  (which  about 40% of Padriat),  tho
Consevatives (25%) amd ie Liberals (10%).-92  -
net oenefits  of introducing  marginal  social  cost  pricn  in the Stockholm  region  and combining
the toll revenues  with a package  of ring road bypass  extensions  and public tansport service
quality  improvements  are esfimated  to be SEK8  billion  [US$1.35  billion]  (Tegndr,  1991).
103.  In September  1992,  the three  political  parties  reached  a final  agreement  regarding  the
adoption  of road use  charging  as an intument to finance  road investments  and public  tansport
for the Stockholm  Region,  which costs a total of SE35.9  billion  [US$6.06  billion]  in 1992
figures  (see  The Social  Democratic  Party,  the Moderate  Party  and the  Liberal  Party, 1992). To
be introduced  in 1996,  the uniform  toll for light  vehicles  (weghing  less than 3.5 metric  tons)
entenng  the toll rng  designed  to surround  the city of Stockholm  will be SEK15 [US$2.53]
initially  whereas  the average  toll  will  be SEKS  [US84  cents)  for  both  inbound  and  outbound  trps
on the West Link.  For heavy  vehicles,  these so-called  'vehicle-use  fees' will be three times
higher  (Malmsten,  1992). A total  of about  25 toll  stations  will  be situated  on all roads  leading
to the city center and 2 toll stations  will be located  at the West Route.  At the dme of this
writing,  a combination  of manual  and  electonic  toll  collection  system  - as in the (24-hour)  Oslo
Toll  Ring  - is planned. The fee system  must  be designed  to satify the stringent  requirements
of securty, anonymity,  flexibility  and the option  of offering  'discounts'.- 93 -
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